In summary of the above explanations of the damages to the upper starboard front bulkhead the following can be concluded:

(a) The forecastle deck forward of the visor lugs was pushed together and the steel began to roll at the port side – however, at frame 160, i.e. 600 mm forward of the strong deck beam at frame 159, this movement stopped. This  rolled up part of the deck remained in this condition. The remaining part of the forecastle deck towards the edge of the front bulkhead was cut through, however only rather narrowly, i.e. apparently by the piston rod of the actuator while the visor moved forward. During the cutting process the edge was bent to starboard only, indicating that the vessel had a heavy heel to starboard at this time. The narrow vertical cut through the front bulkhead from the forepeak deck = C-deck – downwards extended to about half the distance between the 1st and the 2nd transverse hp profile – see arrow 4.on the previous page.

(b) The bulkhead plating next to the vertical recess bulkhead 150-200 mm before the vertical rubber packing has vanished, leaving a space wide enough for the actuator piston to pass through – see arrow 3.

(c) From this particular damage pattern the expert Brian Braidwood has concluded that this damage – on the balance of all probabilities – was caused by an explosion - see Chapter 3.2.2 - pages 1102 ff. of our Report.

(d) The detailed evaluation of the condition of the piston rod of the starboard actuator – see Chapter 30 – pages 1002 ff. of our Report - revealed that - contrary to the port actuator - this piston rod showed only very few scoring marks and the upper screws were not hammered at all. This indicates that the piston rod did not break through the bulkhead – as the port one did – but that the bulkhead was already open, when the actuator passed through.

(e) From the fact that the steel flap at the lower end is seen to be extending forward of the damage – see arrow 10 on page 74 and the images on pages 80-81 – and was torn off the bulkhead and pushed forward by the explosion, it can be concluded that this explosion must have occurred after the visor had moved sufficiently far forward and never moved back as otherwise the steel flap would have been smashed flat against the bulkhead.

(f) This steel flap, having been part of the bulkhead between hp profiles 3 and 4 – see arrow 4 – was no more in place when the divers came in August 2000 as can be seen on the images on pages 82 below and 83. The steel flap was obviously cut off by flame cutting.

(g) Since this steel flap did originate from the centre of the explosion it bears in all probability the finger print of the explosive device.

(h) The ROV used by the Finns during the oil recovery operation from April to June 1996 had the ability to cut steel. It is thus possible that this ROV did the cutting of the steel flap and brought it to the surface. Otherwise it must have been done by divers who were also down at the wreck during the prepara-tions for the covering by sand from May to July 1996.

(j) Consequently it has to be assumed that the steel flap is either in the possession of the Swedish or Finnish government agency in charge, either the Swedish FÅA, the military institute for testing and examining explosives or the Finnish VTT.

(k) It has further to be noted that at the time when the visor obviously moved forward because the deck beam at frame 159 was no more in place, no contact between the aft part of the ramp house and the bow ramp did occur, because there are no contact marks on this side of the ramp house. This allows the conclusion that at this time the bow ramp was not in the ramp house, i.e. no more in upright, closed condition.

The lower part of the starboard front bulkhead is sufficiently documented and explained in Chapter 29.2 on pages 781 ff. of our Report, however there are some changes which shall be documented by means of the following images from the diving expedition in August 2000.