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  D. Further Information received from Sweden, Finland and Estonia after the Publication of our Report
 
 
19. Unknown Extracts from JAIC Protocols
 

Recently some protocols from the internal JAIC meetings were received and analysed which revealed many important facts, however, of which the relevant ones will be mentioned here. These are:

(1) The three “observers” of the National Maritime Administrations of

Estonia – Kalle Pedak

Finland – Jukka Håkåmies and

Sweden – Sten Andersson

were present and actively participated in decisions concerning the contents and wording of the Final JAIC Report. This in spite of the well known fact that all three administrations were or should have been the subject of an impartial investigation, viz.:

(1.1) The Finns were responsible for the issuance of a false Passenger Ship Safety Certificate (PSSC). In this connection attention is drawn to contents of the protocol concerning the JAIC meeting on 16./17.12.1996 at Pärnu under “collision bulkhead”.

»Kari (Lethola) spoke to Edelman (Finnish Maritime Admini-stration): There were two persons (in the administration) who knew that there was a problem. It was assumed that it was “common practice”. Possibly the new inspector did not know about it. He has to write some advice as to this.«

This means that the responsible people in the National Maritime Administration of Finland knew that the ESTONIA did not have a collision bulkhead according to the relevant SOLAS Regulation and hence did not comply with same at the time of the accident , but did nothing.


(1.2) The Estonian National Maritime Board – General Manager Kalle Pedak – was responsible for the wrong issuance (by Bureau Veritas) of the PSSC onboard at the time of the casualty confirming that the ferry fully complied with the applicable SOLAS requirements, which  was apparently untrue. The “collision bulkhead” was still in the wrong place, respectively where an additional collision door should have been installed there was none, which had crucial consequences at least for the speed of sinking and the number of victims.

(1.3) The Swedish Maritime Administration – Sjöfartsverket – was represented from the first to the last meeting by Sten Andersson, although this Administration was responsible for the condition of the safety relevant installations of the ferry regularly calling at Stockholm. Furthermore, on the afternoon before her last departure from Tallinn the ferry had been inspected by safety experts from Sjöfartsverket according to Port State Control (PSC) criteria and very severe deficiencies were found which would have prevented the ferry’s departure from a Swedish port (Åke Sjöblom in a recent interview by Maria Carlshamve – TV4). It had been in the hands of this organisation to undertake the proper steps to prevent the ESTONIA from leaving Tallinn, however this was not done and – consequently - more than 1000 people lost their lives.

(2) The Head of the Nautical Department of ESCO and as such responsible for qualification and training standard of Master, officers and deck crew of the ESTONIA and security adviser of ESTLINE, Captain Enn Neidre, was forced to resign from his position as member of the Estonian JAIC because he was considered to be biased as he was investigating his own area of responsibility. This was announced to the JAIC at the meeting on 23./24.05.1996 in Helsinki. It is noted in the protocol as follows:


»Priit Männik is the new Estonian member. Enn Neidre is completely (no expert).«


At the meeting of the JAIC in Stockholm from 19.-21.11.1996, however, he was already back as “expert” and thereafter attended all the meetings and participated actively in the drafting of the Final Report in favour of his company ESCO, the crew he was responsible for and his country Estonia.

(3) From the Protocol of the JAIC meeting at Pärnu on 16/17.12.96 the following is noteworthy:


»Tuomo (Karppinen) and Klaus (Rahka) want a written report from somebody about the paint layers of the forepeak lugs. Atlantic lock – original – important! (last painting of the Atlantic lock in 1990). Mikael (Huss) will send the material to VTT 17/12 for further handling.«

note   Note: The result of the subsequent examination proven that the initial primer of the lugs of the Atlantic lock was grey, while the initial primer of the visor lug and the complete foreship used by Meyer Werft was yellow. A clean indication that the Atlantic lock was not the one originally installed by the yard.

The protocol continues:

»Laur wants a written statement from Mäkäläinen, the contact of Tuomo (Karppinen) for the change of the locks.«


This means that Karppinen had, in addition to the former boatswain Juhani Luttunen – see Chapter 3.3, Enclosure 3.3.83 of our Report – a further witness confirming that the Atlantic lock had been exchanged and therefore was not the original. Needless to say that nothing of this is mentioned in the JAIC Report.

(4) The Protocol of the JAIC editors’ meeting on the Final Report on 27.11.95 in Stockholm reveals that the JAIC knew much more about what actually happened on the bridge at the crucial time because in connection with the question which statements should be included Uno Laur said:

“I believe that the officers left the bridge which was empty for several minutes. Ask Andi Meister at the meeting.”


This can only mean that for some reason, and it must have been a very serious one, the watch officers left the bridge for several minutes at a time when the vessel was in a critical condition in extremly heavy weather.
This important fact is not  mentioned in the JAIC Report nor in the Andi Meister’s book “The Unfinished Logbook”.  Here we have a further example of the knowledge of the JAIC of circumstances important to the investigation and the public in general which was hidden by them with the apparent consent of the Government institutions, guiding them. Olof Forssberg, Kari Lethola and Uno Laur did attend this meeting, Andi Meister was not present.

The source of this information obtained by the Estonian JAIC is unknown. It could, however, only be Einar Kukk, Silver Linde and/or Avo Piht, who was reportedly questioned in Tallinn before he disappeared. (Statement Maart Laar then and now again Prime Minister of Estonia.)

In this connection attention has to be drawn again to the mysteries surrounding the bodies on the bridge, viz.:

  • Officially 3 bodies were found and not identified, because - according to Börje Stenström: “The officers on the bridge were not personally known to the divers.”
note   Note: But they were all wearing uniforms with stripes on their shirts: Master 4 stripes, chief mate 3 stripes, 2nd mate 2 stripes, 3rd mate 1 stripe, 4th mate ½ stripe.
  • The location of these bodies was explained by the divers on the available video footage without the bodies being visible. None of the divers mention that another of the bodies was heavily attacked by fish as stated by Johan Fransson of Sjöfartsverket. Consequently there have to be other videos. – See Chapter 13 – Enclosure 13.

  • In the Report by Johan Fransson – Sjöfartsverket – such a heavily attacked, i.e. injured or partly destroyed body is, however, mentioned, thus it has to be assumed that there was a fourth one on the bridge. And indeed the detailed evaluation of the video films by Disengage it turned brought to light that the (official) first diver pulled out half a body (only part from the belt upwards was still visible) through one of the lower windows of the port bridge wing to the outside and then let it go floating.

  • In the Estonian media and  in Andi Meister’s book details are reported on 2 of the 3 official bodies on the bridge, which are not taken from the official videos, viz.

    • the body at the port aft door was reported to be wearing a brown or red/brown suit or blazer, and

    • the body underneath the flag box in the starboard bridge wing had a tattoo on his right hand. See also Chapter 27, pages 727 ff. of our Report.

These details cannot be found on the video footage officially available, but it can be reasonably asssumed, that they were known to the members of the JAIC
but – for reasons unknown – were kept secret.

In this context it is interesting to note that the Finnish JAIC has stated to have obtained 20 videos from the “Semi 1” expedition in December 1994, whereas the Swedish JAIC states to have only 17, although both were jointly in charge of the expedition - together with Sjöfartsverket.

 
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