- Chapter 8 – Emergency and Lifesaving Arrangements and Equipment.
These arrangements have not been investigated by us and we have just taken over from the JAIC Report what was stated assuming that this would be correct bearing in mind that the representatives of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Administration and the General Manager of the Estonian National Maritime Board – see Chapter 35.3 of our Report – did actively participate in the drafting of the JAIC Report. This was apparently wrong because our attention was drawn to the following by one major ferry operator in non-European waters:
»With regard to the Report in general it fails to clarify both the illegal life-saving equipment (only 45% capacity under davits), the illegal lifevests and free-fall rafts (SOLAS B-type – rubbish), the illegal watertight subdivision with one, two or even three (open) doors in every bulkhead, the bilge pump system, the non-existing emergency and evacuation plants, false certificates, etc. All directly related to passenger safety and why so many died.«
This is – after all – not surprising since not even the number of victims has been correctly stated by the JAIC.
In Interview No. IV/6 by the Peter Örn Group - Roland Stahl of the ID – Commission of the Swedish Rikspolice has e.g. stated:
“In case the wreck would be recovered I do assume that at least 1100-1200 bodies would have to be identified because the latest passenger lists were rather uncertain.”
In connection with the over-aged lifevests the Technical Director of Nordström & Thulin and board member of Estline, Sten-Christer Forsberg, told the media that they would have renewed the lifevests if that would have been required by Sjöfartsverket, which it was not.
- Chapter 14 – The Day in Tallinn.
It is known now from the Testimony of Silver Linde – see Chapter 18 of this Update – that the mentioned sailor in the cherry-picker on the open bow ramp also worked on the bottom of the somewhat lowered down visor.
It is further known from the same testimony that during every stay in Tallinn a van of the laundry company Saaramaa drove on to the car deck to change the laundry. Also a garbage truck drove each time in Tallinn on to the car deck to collect the garbage, however, according to Silver Linde, not until 14.00 hours during the last day in Tallinn.
- Chapter 15 – The Sjöfartsverket Inspectors and their Trainees.
It has to be assumed that the ferry’s command had been informed already in the morning that the two Swedish inspectors with their Estonian trainees would inspect the ferry because – according to Silver Linde – Chapter 18 of this Update – the boatswain was rather excited running around with oil can and lubricants.
- Chapter 17.3 – Other Information (as to Loading and Securing of the Cargo).
The information as to what was really loaded on to the car deck and where what was placed is still unclear.
Silver Linde has now testified – see Chapter 18 of this Update – that the car deck had been empty forward of the centre casing, which is completely contrary to the statements of several passengers and crew members who testified that two cars and one van stood directly behind the bow ramp (Henrik Sillaste, Antti Aarak). On the other hand, if the trucks, trailers, busses and cars which are listed in the cargo manifest and customs list had actually been loaded, the car deck was full, i.e. there was hardly any space left. Consequently it has to be assumed that either Silver Linde had not been on the car deck after the end of his watch on 27.09.94 at 14.00 hours, which is practically impossible because the way to the forecastle – his manoeuvre station during departure – had been from the centre casing via the car deck into one of the side houses and then upstairs to the forecastle deck, or he deliberately did not tell the truth to draw our attention to something in this particular area, as he did before.
For the purpose of this investigation it has to be assumed that the car deck was stowed full with vehicles.
- Chapter 20 – The Route – Wind and Sea Conditions Actually Encountered – The Speed.
The actual route is still being discussed in Sweden and the Independent Fact Group (IFG) – has published a “Partial Status Report – MV ‘Estonia’ – The Last Voyage” under w.factgroup.nu/tgframe.eng.html, by means of which they attempt to prove that ESTONIA took a northerly course at first and then followed a course more or less parallel to the two Finland ferries, but more south. The IFG further attempt to prove that the ferry departed from Tallinn at 19.00 hours (because they need the time), although there are statements that at this time still trucks had been loaded.
In any event, even considering a departure time of 19.00 hours this would mean that the ferry had 5½ hours to reach her most western position probably at least 2 nm to the SW of the wreck position, i.e. to cover a distance of 105 nm. This requires an average speed of 19 kn which can be excluded, ESTONIA probably made this or a slightly higher speed only for the first 2 hours, where after the speed went considerably down due to the increasing head sea. Therefore and because we have no doubt in the statement of the “Amber” mate we do not accept the IFG route nor do we accept most of their other explanations. The actual route of the ESTONIA is completely known to those in charge of the investigation in Finland, there is a mate, who knows his own course and followed the ESTONIA on his TM radar to the very end. Furthermore, there is a sea chart with position and even an automatic plot with all the positions and times of relevance, both are, however, not made available by the Finnish JAIC.
As explained in Chapter 3 of the Update the visor must have been found very close – probably in contact – to the wreck. Therefore the visor position on the chart – page 426 A – is not correct.
- Chapter 21 – Summary of Testimonies by Survivors.
There is considerable new evidence from the watch sailor Silver Linde which is outlined in Chapter 18 of this Update and to some extent also influences the statements of Treu, Kadak and Sillaste.
- Chapter 24 – Locating the Wreck and the Visor.
Page 705 – Fax AIB to PCIMA dated 07.10.94: The paragraph 2) was partly wrongly translated. The correct wording is: 2) “3 vessels are available (at least 2 for security reasons) mine hunter VON, KONTER and ULVÖN”.
Page 706 – second line must read: “…visible on the recording between 22.47.31 and 22.49.01”.
Lines 5-13 should be changed to: “It was possible to decode the x- and y-coordinates by means of the F.B.N. computer and the resulting position is 59°22.85’N; 21°42,7’E. This position lies ca. 180 m to the SSW of the stern of the wreck.”
Page 709 – delete in the second line: “Tuomo Karppinen and others from Finland” because according to the “Personnel onboard” lists of the “Semi 1” Karppinen was not onboard during the time in question.
At the end of paragraph 1 – “See Enclosure 24.407” has to be added.
Page 717 – The position in the second line has to be “59°22’54’N; 21°40’51”E” which lies about 180 m to the SSW of the stern of the wreck. See also page 706 – the decoded x- and y-coordinates of the big sonar contact.
- Chapter 27 – The Diving Investigation 01.-04.12.94.
Page 722 after (1) change “starboard” to “port”.
Page 757 – the drawing is to be turned by 180°.
Page 771 – S3 starboard and forecastle deck. Interpretation – the first paragraph to be changed to:
“Images no. 1 and 2 show a piece of the green painted forecastle deck pushed forward and together which is shown and explained in Chapter 2.3.4 of this Update.” Delete the rest of this paragraph including “Unexplained Evidence”.
No. 3 – change frame 149 to “frame 159”.
- Chapter 30 – The Condition of the Visor.
Page 1025: 8 – The text below the picture is to be changed as follows: “The arrow points to a damage to the aft port edge of the visor bottom which is already visible on the video made after the visor was officially ‘found’ on 18.10.94, i.e. 4 weeks before the ‘official’ recovery operation commenced.” See Chapter 3.3 of the Update.
5 – change the 2nd–4th lines to: “which occurred during the first recovery operation and was increased during the second ‘official’ operation”.
These are the parts which we consider that have to be corrected respectively amended.
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