12.3
Always on Time
The distance from
Tallinn to Söderarm is 173 nm, to Sandhamn 177 nm. The distance from Söderarm
to Frihamn, however, is 54 nm corresponding to 41/2 hours steaming time (in
most parts of the archipelago the speed is restricted to 12 kn), whilst the
distance from Sandhamn is only 42 nm corresponding to 3.5 hours steaming time.
Therefore the Sandhamn route was preferred.
Assuming that
ESTONIA departed from Tallinn on time (which was seldom the case) she was
turned on outbound course at the earliest 15 minutes later, whereafter it
needed some minutes to reach full speed (which is not taken into account).
The ferry consequently had 14.75 hours to reach Stockholm.
In case the
Söderarm entrance had to be used she had available for the 173 nm long sea
voyage 14.75 hours less 4.5 hours through the archipelago = 10.25 hours,
i.e. she had to make an average speed of 16.87 kn to be at the pilot
station on time.
In case the
Sandhamn entrance would be used, there was some more time because she had
available 14.75 hours less 3.5 hours through the archipelago = 11.25 hours,
thus had to make an average speed of only 15.73 kn to be on time at
the pilot station.
An evaluation
of the logbooks of the Stockholm pilots for the time between ESTONIA's first
call on 03.02.93 and her last call on 26.09.94 revealed the following:
- During 20 months of service the ferry was only once delayed for 1 hour and that was on 1 January 1994 at the Sandhamn pilot station.
- At Frihamn Terminal ESTONIA during the same period of time the ferry arrived late only 8 times with max. delay of 24 minutes (also on 01.01.94).
- None of these delays could apparently be attributed to weather influence.
- Delays occurred, however, generally upon departure from Stockholm, although only seldom of more than 20 minutes.
- In total, the vessel departed from Stockholm 12 times with more than a 30-minute delay. It has to be assumed that it was worse in Tallinn, according to the reports of previous passengers. Pilot or harbour master logbooks from Tallinn, however, are not available to this 'Group of Experts'.
An examination of the logbook entries of the Stockholm Pilots Association for the three days, when according to the SMHI ESTONIA had met wind and sea state conditions comparable to those encountered during the night of the casualty, has revealed the following:
On 5 February 1993
ESTONIA arrived at 05.59 hours at the Sandhamn Pilot, on 23 January 1994 at
05.43 hours at Söderarm Pilot and on 6 March 1994 at 05.25 hours at Sandhamn
Pilot. Consequently she was always on time. The respective logbook pages are
attached as Enclosures
12.3.140, 12.3.141
.
Since no detailed
information is available from the Estonian side and previous passengers frequently
experienced considerable delays on arrival in Tallinn, the eastbound voyages
cannot be evaluated.
In any event,
it is a fact that ESTONIA met at least 6 times similar or worse wind and wave
conditions compared to those she met on the night of the accident, however,
without delayed arrival (on the westbound voyages) and it is unknown whether
damage to the visor and its locking devices were sustained. The last time
she met similar conditions was only on 19 August 1994, i.e. 5 weeks before
the casualty, and at this time all the disastrous deficiencies - as will be
explained later on - were already existing.
The evaluation
of the arrival times at the Stockholm Pilot stations outlined above also reveals
that ESTONIA obviously always maintained her schedule, regardless of the prevailing
weather and/or ice conditions.
The explanation for this adherence to schedule by all means and under all circumstances can probably be found in
(a) the pride of the newcomer wanting to be at least as good as the competitors Silja and Viking.
(b) the pressure of competition from the large and more comfortable Stockholm-Helsinki ferries which - according to Ulf Hobro - was also the reason for the installation of stabilisers at high costs after less than 1 year in service. As a matter of fact Ulf Hobro had asked Turku Repair Yard already in the beginning of April 1993, i.e. after ESTONIA had been in service for just 2 months, but mainly in bad weather, to quote for the installation of stabilisers. The offer was submitted on 5 April 1993 and is attached as Enclosure 12.3.143.
The pressure on the masters of ESTONIA from the Board members of Estline AB is confirmed by the statement of Captain Per Ringhagen - Enclosure 5.3.111 - who has stated that during board meetings of Estline AB it had been repeatedly stressed that ESTONIA had to maintain her arrival at Stockholm by all means and that this had been made quite clear to the masters, who sometimes attended the board meetings. This is said to be written in the protocols of these board meetings which must be still available. The apparent fact that the masters of ESTONIA did their utmost to maintain the schedule was obviously not unknown to the crew as it is demonstrated by the questioning of motorman Ziljajev, who testified in this connection as follows:
Q:
Was it a must or was it a requirement from the management that ESTONIA or
any other vessel may not miss her schedule, i.e. be delayed?
A: With ESTONIA we were always on time. The master had a time schedule
received from the owners and we were always on time. The masters always followed
the schedule received from the company. According to contract he had to follow
this schedule.
Q: You have now told us about the obligations of the master to follow
the schedule. There are rumours that masters who are unable to keep the schedule
will be sacked.
A: Yes, that is principally so. This is the requirement of the company
that the master has to maintain the schedule. Some of the passengers have
to reach other connections and if they miss them, because the vessel is delayed,
the company has to pay compensation.
Q: Which company has worked out the schedule?
A: Estline AB. But I don't blame Estline for anything. Each company
has its own schedule, where it is described up to the minute. If a company
buys a ship, then it is not completely known how the vessel reacts during
operation, how much power is needed, among other things, during a storm.
The complete interview of Ivan Ziljajev is attached as Enclosure 13.193 and is also available on video cassette.
