Based on the "Request
for Classification" dated 27 September 1979 (Enclosure
2.4.3.32) - 2 pages - Meyer Werft requested Bureau Veritas to proceed
with the operations required by their Rules for the purpose of obtaining the
classification under Special Survey, i.e. construction drawings were to be
checked against the rules and the building of the vessel was to be supervised,
same as one year before the DIANA II.
On page 2 of this
particular form among other things it is stated:
»Certificates
to be issued by the Society on behalf of the National
Authorities.
Load-Line
Statutory Safety Construction, Safety Equipment, Safety Radio
Tonnage National, Suez Canal, Panama Canal«
each possibility
having a 'YES/NO' box attached.
On the above-mentioned
form filled in by Meyer Werft the 'NO' box referring to the load-line is marked,
whilst in all other cases the 'YES' boxes are marked.
According to the
interpretation of the B.V. head office this means that the Yard has requested
B.V. just to issue the Load Line Certificate and to specifically exclude any
Statutory Certificates. Actually Meyer Werft had filed a further application
dated 21 April 1980 with Bureau Veritas, viz. "Application for an International
Freeboard Certificate or for an International Load Line Exemption Certificate
within the Scope of the International Convention on Load Lines 1966" which
would mean that the Yard applied for the same services a second time (Enclosure
2.4.3.33). The Load Line Certificate was in fact issued by B.V.
In 1979/1980 the
"1977 Rules of B.V." were in force. According to §§ 11-44, indentations 2
and 3 of those rules the following applied to bow visors:
»2 - Bow and
stern doors
21
- When the ship is equipped with a bow door, to allow access to garage,
the collision bulkhead must have a removable part. This design is acceptable
only above bulkhead deck and only if the removable part has a watertightness
and a strength equivalent to those of fixed rule bulkhead.
A movable access ramp may be used for this purpose.
22 - Scantlings of plating and stiffeners of a bow door are to be equivalent
to those of adjacent shell structure.«
(See
Enclosure 2.4.3.34)
This means that
the bow ramp, located above bulkhead deck = car deck, served as the upper
extension of the collision bulkhead no matter what the distance to the forward
perpendicular was, provided the bow ramp was watertight and had a strength
equivalent to those of fixed collision bulkheads.
These conditions
were fulfilled by the bow ramp of VIKING SALLY, thus the construction complied
with the B.V. Rules in force at the time the vessel was built. Only one year
later, in 1981, the SOLAS 1974 Rules were incorporated into the B.V. Rules
which had no more effect on VIKING SALLY because she had already been delivered
in June 1980.
»3 - Securing
of doors
31
- Doors and screen-doors have to be firmly secured by use of cleats conveniently
spaced or other similar devices. Particularly it has to be provided one
of these devices at each corner of opening. Structure reinforcements have
to be realised on door and adjacent shell plating to attached points of
cleats, hinges, jacks, etc.«
(See
Enclosure 2.4.3.34)
The BV-Hamburg office,
in charge of plan approval, received already soon after the signing of the
contract a continuous flow of drawings from the Yard and von Tell. According
to the B.V. head office all drawings received with approval date and status
are listed in the attached Enclosure
2.4.3.35, whilst according to another list sent by B.V. head office by
letter of 10 January 1995 to the JAIC - Enclosure
2.4.3.36 - further drawings referring to bow visor/bow ramp area, which
are not noted in the first list, are noted and have been approved by BV-Hamburg,
i.e. drawings 1103-Bow Visor, 1106-Locking Devices of Bow Visor and 1101-Foreship
Frame 149-forward.
In their letter
to the JAIC dated 10.01.95 B.V. explains the approval procedure including
the above-mentioned drawings as follows:
»The bow door
drawings of the MV ESTONIA were reviewed by the Hamburg local office of
Bureau Veritas which was in charge of the review. List of reviewed drawings
is given as annex 4.«
(Enclosure
2.4.3.37)
»The drawings
were checked against the Bureau Veritas 1977 rules which did not contain
formula for the rule strength of securing devices of shell doors opening
outwards. Information was received from the bow door designer, Messrs. von
Tell, which stated in their telex dated 18 March 1980 to the local Bureau
Veritas office in Hamburg that they had designed according to the Lloyd's
Register rules.«
What actually happened
during the approval phase of the relevant drawings concerning the bow visor
and the locking devices is already explained in Subchapter 2.4.2, but is also
demonstrated by the approval dates of those drawings, i.e.
Actually the
senior B.V. surveyor G.Lohmann, entrusted with the newbuilding supervision
of DIANA II / VIKING SALLY and also with their predeces-sors, had accepted
the bow visor in its entirety already on 20.06.80 by his signature on the
Receipt/Transfer Certificate (Enclosure
2.4.2.22).
In their letter
to the JAIC dated 10.01.95 (Enclosure
2.4.3.37) B.V. also draws the attention to the remarks made in red on
drawings 1103 and 49111-330, i.e.
on drawing 1103
- Bow Visor - : Remarks on the drawing
»1. Arrangements of locking devices subject to the approval of the national
Authorities.
2.
Watertightness of the ramp and local reinforcements of the ship's structures
in way of locking devices, cylinders and hinges to Surveyor's satisfaction.
3. Jack lifting eye on arms, atlantic lock eye, side lock eyes, requested
in steel grade St52-3.
4. Local reinforcements requested and indicated under the side locks active
in y-direction (transverse).«
As stated above,
this drawing was approved only on 20.06.80 - the day the vessel went out for
trials - thus shortly before her delivery - and returned to the Yard subsequently,
and it is indeed the question of what use such remarks are if they are made
on drawings which are returned to the Yard only after the vessel has already
left.
This is slightly
different with the von Tell drawing 49111-330 - General Arrangement of Bow
Visor and Bow Ramp - which was approved already on 05.11.79 and subsequently
returned to von Tell with the following remarks in red:
»1. Arrangement
of locking devices and protection against shifting cargoes subject to the
approval of the National Authorities.
2.
Watertightness of the ramp and bow visor to Surveyor's satisfaction.
3. Local reinforcement of the ship's structure in way of - locking devices
- cylinders - hinges to Surveyor's satisfaction.
4. High pressure flexible pipes must be approved by B.V.«
B.V.'s explanation
for these remarks in their letter of 10.01.95:
»By the remark
concerning the National Authorities it was made clear that locking devices
were considered as an item subject to the examination and approval of the
Finnish Authorities issuing the Passenger Ship Safety Certificate of the
vessel.«
In order to obtain
clarification how this was actually to be interpreted the official opinion
of B.V. was requested via their Stockholm lawyer - Bengt-Åke Johnson - who
has commented as follows:
»With regard
to the wording in German on the drawing 590/1103 to which you refer in your
fax of 20 February 1995, I have learned that Bureau Veritas inserted the
wording just to clarify that the approval of Bureau Veritas did only concern
the parts of the construction that were covered by the rules of Bureau Veritas
then applicable in 1979 and that Bureau Veritas made the remark on the drawings
in order to remove doubts and to direct the attention of the shipyard and
the Finnish authorities to the fact that the locking devices were to be
considered and approved by the Finnish authorities. Accordingly, Bureau
Veritas approved the drawings to the extent the arrangements were generally
complying with the Bureau Veritas rules, but wanted to draw the attention
of the shipyard and the Finnish authorities to the fact, that Bureau Veritas
could not approve something, i.e. the locking devices, which were not specifically
covered by Bureau Veritas' rules of 1979.«
It is quite obvious
by the remark quoted above in their letter to the JAIC of 10.01.95, as well
as by the comments of Bengt-Åke Johnson, that B.V. wants to create the impression
that the final approval of the locking devices is the responsibility of the
National Maritime Administration, i.e. the F.B.N., because they issue the
Passenger Ship Safety Certificate.
As a result of this
investigation it has to concluded that this is wrong because
(a) Rule 3 of
the 1977 B.V. Rules requires, among others, that "Doors ... have to be firmly
secured by use of cleats conventionally spaced or other similar devices."
It reveals from the B.V. letter to the JAIC dated 10.01.95 -
Enclosure 2.4.3.37 - that cleats = cleating = locking devices consequently
the locking devices of the bow door = visor were part of the B.V. approval;
(b) B.V.
had anyway to carry out the approval even if it would have been the responsibility
of the F.B.N., because it was a "structural matter" which B.V. had to carry
out on behalf of F.B.N. due to the respective contract between the organisations.
- See also Subchapter 2.4.4.
The
above is confirmed by the acting of B.V. surveyor Lohmann as well as by the
statement of the principal surveyor of the B.V. Stockholm office, Lars-Olof
Ålander, according to which he felt responsible for the locking devices and
sensors. - See Enclosure
9.1.134.
Futhermore the B.V.
head office was asked to explain by what means, for example, could a plan
approver make sure that a "door", i.e. bow visor, would be "firmly secured
by use of cleats", i.e. locking devices, dimensioned as per drawing which
he is asked to approve? The answer was that B.V. relied on the design office
(von Tell AB) and the Yard, respectively their calculations, but made no own
calculations.
This means that the
relevant drawings were approved on basis of the von Tell AB calculations carried
out according to the Lloyd's Register requirements, the result of which was
submitted to BV-Hamburg by telex of 18.03.80 (Enclosure
2.4.2.23). The Yard carried out own calculations with about the same result.
Consequently both the Yard and its subcontractor individually performed calculations,
whilst B.V. and F.B.N. did not.
The B.V. head office
was further asked by what means did the B.V. surveyor on site make sure that
the Yard/von Tell installed locking devices according to the approved drawings.
The answer: »By random inspections.«
Upon request of
the B.V. head office after the ESTONIA catastrophe the senior B.V. surveyor
G.Lohmann wrote down the remarks made in his notebook during the newbuilding
phase in relation to the bow visor (with English translation made by himself
indicating what he would like to have noted) - see
Enclosure 2.4.3.38
Actually the only
notes he made in respect of the bow visor were:
28.03.80 -
"Bugklappenanschluß
an Hinterkante" by G.Lo., i.e. "Connection of bow visor to aft part"
but was translated by Lohmann with:
"Inspection of hull construction according to the remarks made on drawings
of Messrs. Tell during approval." The only von Tell drawing he could
have had by then was 49111-330 - "General Arrangement of Bow Visor and Bow
Ramp" which shows details of the bow ramp hinges only. Actually it has to
be assumed that the remark in the notebook: "Connection of bow visor to
aft part" refers to connecting the visor to the vessel, i.e. fitting the
hinges together which was done at about that time.
23.04.80 -
"Allgemeine Besichtigung Freibord" by J.D. = J.Drazenowic (the assistant
to G.Lohmann), i.e. "General Freeboard Survey" which was translated by G.Lohmann
with:
"Checking of closing arrangements for the Freeboard Report Form Mod.
195."
This Freeboard Survey was apparently carried out as a result of the "Application
for an International Freeboard Certificate" (Enclosure
2.4.3.33) dated 21.04.1980.
The respective
Report on Form 195 is attached as
Enclosure 2.4.3.39.
11.06.80 -
"Kontrolle der Seitenhäuser vorn and achtern sowie des achteren Mittelhauses
auf dem Hauptdeck - Geringe Restarbeiten"
i.e. "Control of side houses forward and aft as well as the aft centre casing
on main deck - minor remaining work", which is translated as:
"Checkings
in way of car deck forward including bow ramp and bow visor - resting and
connection."
Actually
the side houses forward and aft at both sides are the B-deck spaces between
A-deck and C-deck which contain stairways, chain lockers, but also the void
spaces from which the manual side locks can be operated and where the hydraulic
side locks are located.
26.06.80
-
"Fortsetzung
des Programms vom 25. Juni 1980 in See, u.a. Kontrolle des Bugvisiers",
i.e.
"At sea,
continuing the program from 25 June 1980, among other things, bow visor",
which is translated as:
"During trials
at sea under normal running conditions the space between bow visor and bow
ramp has been inspected for tightness."
In this respect
reference is also made to the statement of G.Todsen -
Enclosure 2.4.2.21 - where this check is explained in detail.
The extracts from
G.Lohmann's notebook closes with the Note:
»For inspections,
tests, and trials yard protocols are made from the yard and signed by the
parties concerned.«
Both surveyors -
G.Lohmann and J.Drazenowic - were then the Oldenburg Field office of B.V..
As the signed statement
of G.Lohmann made to this 'Group of Experts' has not been returned by B.V.
and thus cannot be made an enclosure to this report, his career and involvement
in Meyer Werft newbuildings including VIKING SALLY shall be outlined as follows:
Günther Lohmann was
born in 1929 and started his professional career in 1944 as shipbuilding apprentice
with HDW-Hamburg and stayed with this yard until 1956.
On 01.05.1956 he
started as consulting engineer with engineer H. Rössler VD at Oldenburg and
carried out newbuilding inspection and superintendent work for various owners,
also non-exclusive surveyor work for B.V. (expert adjoint N.E.) until end
of December 1976. From 01.01.1977 he was senior surveyor and exclusive surveyor
for B.V. in charge, i.e. responsible, for the Oldenburg office. His district
extended from Cuxhaven to Bodenwerder and to the Dutch border, i.e. the Meyer
Werft in Papenburg belonged to his area.
He remained in this
position until the end of March 1994, whereafter he retired, however, was
recommissioned shortly afterwards as a field surveyor.
In his capacity
as senior surveyor of the BV-Oldenburg office he supervised to a varying extent
the newbuildings APOLLO, DIANA, VIKING 1, 3, 4 & 5, DIANA II, and VIKING SALLY
on behalf of Bureau Veritas. Over the years he developed a very good relationship
to the responsible people of the Meyer Werft. This included for example the
work force who used to consult him whenever they had technical questions to
make matters acceptable to class. He also had close contact with representatives
of the National Authorities as well as owners' representatives who, as far
as VIKING SALLY is concerned, were members of the Johansson family, Captain
Brunström, and chief engineer Lars Karlsson.
His main duties
were to make sure that the vessels were built according to the approved drawings
in relation to the rules and in accordance with sound workmanship.
In line with these
activities he had also carefully inspected the construction of the bow visor
of VIKING SALLY, its installation, fitting of hinges, and welding of bushings.
Furthermore, he did attend the watertightness test before and during trials.
He recalls having been in the inner side of the visor during trials out in
the North Sea together with the von Tell representative, somebody from the
owners and also from the Yard, when it was discovered at full speed that some
water was leaking through the rubber packings. Consequently local adjustments
of the rubber packings were considered necessary and were made after the return
to Emden, whereafter a hose-test confirmed watertightness of the visor.
He has been shown
various pictures of the visor hinges with severe burning marks as found after
the casualty and confirmed that what is visible on the pictures would never
have been accepted by him, because it does not conform to the standard workmanship
of the Meyer Werft, and further, is not in agreement with what he had seen.
This also relates to the visor lug. The vessel would never have left the Yard
in this condition.
He drew attention
to the fact that at the same time when VIKING SALLY was under construction
the yard was also building tanks for gas tankers which he also inspected on
behalf of B.V., in particular the welding seams, where the requirements are
very strict. Frequently the same welders were working on VIKING SALLY as well
as on the gas tanks. Therefore, he was known to have the tendency to overstress
his requirements as to the quality of welding seams in general. He was sometimes
criticised for applying the same standard when checking the quality of the
welding seams for gas tanks and normal vessels such as VIKING SALLY.
As to the Atlantic
lock he stated the same as he did above in respect of the hinges: The welding
seams visible on the pictures shown to him would never have been accepted
by him, because they do not conform to the standard workmanship of Meyer Werft
which he did survey.
In summary, senior
surveyor G.Lohmann and his assistant J.Drazenowic did carry out the newbuilding
supervision, apparently as required and as necessary in good co-operation
with yard workers, F.B.N. inspectors, and subcontractors, e.g. G.Todsen and
H.Brandt representing von Tell AG. Reportedly they made sure by random checking
that the vessel was built in accordance with the approved drawings, the requirements
of the rules and the standard workmanship of Meyer Werft.
The Yard, as well
as von Tell, were sending 4 copies of each drawing to be approved to BV-Hamburg
of which
1 was returned
with approval
1 was sent
to head office Paris
1 was sent
to Oldenburg office
1 was kept
in Hamburg office
As the B.V. surveyors
were at the yard practically every day where they had their own office they
also received drawings directly from the yard before these drawings were received
from BV-Hamburg with the approval stamp.
Due to the fact that
during the first weeks after contract signing it was generally assumed that
the entire foreship area would be more or less identical to DIANA II lots
of drawings were just copied and marked 590. This refers also to drawing 1106
- Interlock of Bow Visor - which shows the visor hinge construction on both
sides of visor and vessel including the hinge plates. Also this drawing was
taken over from DIANA II, consequently showed the hinge plate construction
as installed on board this vessel, i.e. with 4 hinge plates each side on the
vessel, each being 30 mm thick, i.e. in total 120 mm, with fixed bolts. (See
attached photo showing DIANA II - Enclosure
2.4.3.40) The drawing 1106 showing the above explained DIANA II construction
was sent to BV-Hamburg for approval by letter of 07.11.79. Due to owners'
wishes and with the consent of the B.V. surveyor, this hinge plate design
was changed in December 1979 from 4 to 2 hinge plates of 60 mm thickness each,
and the fixed bolts were changed to the floating-bolts system. In consequence
the total thickness of 120 mm (initially 4 x 30 mm, subsequently 2 x 60 mm)
remained unchanged (Enclosure
2.4.3.41). Drawing 1106 and the respective detail drawings for production
were changed on 02.01.80 as per Enclosure
2.4.3.42.
The revised drawing
1106 was sent by letter of 09.01.80 (Enclosure
2.4.3.43) to von Tell GmbH for approval and the same day to BV-Hamburg
for approval (Enclosure 2.4.3.44). Moreover the drawing was also handed over
to Lohmann at the yard. The drawing was returned by von Tell already by letter
of 15.01.80 without comments, i.e. approved.
B.V. returned the
approved drawing 1106 only on 30.06.80 (approval date 20.06.80), but the approved
drawing was the one sent on 07.11.79 for approval with the DIANA II version
of hinge plates.
It has to be assumed
that upon return of the approved drawing 1106 - at a time when the vessel
had been fully accepted by the class, was delivered to owners and had left
for the Baltic already - the yard just looked for the approval and put the
drawing into the archive not noting that it was the wrong one which had been
approved.
What happened inside
the B.V. organisation is unknown to this 'Group of Experts', however, it is
a fact that the B.V. surveyors at the yard were provided with a continuous
stream of new drawings simultaneously with the drawings being sent to BV-Hamburg
or elsewhere. Therefore, this 'Group of Experts' concludes that senior surveyor
G.Lohmann must have had drawing 1106 in the VIKING SALLY version, latest when
he inspected the "connection of the visor to the vessel" on 28.03.80 according
to his notebook (Enclosure
2.4.3.38) because there can be no doubt that a senior surveyor with the
experience of G.Lohmann would have noted at once that there were just 2 instead
of 4 hinge plates at each of the hinges unless he was aware of the changes
and had the corrected drawing at hand.
Further reference
is made to the letter of B.V. of 10.01.95 to the JAIC (Enclosure
2.4.3.37) where on page 4
- The appraisal
for the selection of material
- Survey
during construction
- Survey of bow
visor welds
- Issuance
of Statutory Certificates,
i.e. issued by B.V.
and F.B.N. is commented. In this connection a "Summary of B.V. inspections
during the newbuilding phase" is attached as Enclosure
2.4.3.44.1.
On page 5, B.V.
discusses the Monitoring of Bow Locking and states:
»Also in 1991-1992
the bow door and bow ramp control and monitoring devices were checked by
the Finnish Authorities against the new IMO requirements.«
This is denied by
the Finnish Authorities, i.e. the F.B.N., because in their opinion the locking
devices of the visors are not their responsibility, but have to be looked
after by the Classification Society (which was confirmed by the retired principal
surveyor of the BV-Stockholm office - Lars Olof Ålander - see Enclosure
2.4.3.44.2). This will be discussed in more detail in Subchapter 2.4.4.
B.V. further discusses in their letter of 10.01.95 the "Bow door cleating
and monitoring arrangements" and remarks with regard to the manual side
locks:
»2 manually
operated fasteners for heavy weather with limit switches on bolts (open
and closed position).«
Since it was confirmed
by ESTONIA's 2nd engineer Peeter Tüür in his statement dated 03.10.94 - Enclosure
12.5.183 - and also by the system engineer Henrik Sillaste and the motorman
Tanel Moosaar during their interview on 10.03.95 -
Enclosure 21.2.4.278 - that it was the boatswain's duty to close these
manual side locks whenever heavy weather was forecasted, it has to be assumed
that this was common knowledge to both crews of ESTONIA.
The statement of
B.V., that these manually operated fasteners were connected to limit switches,
however, does not refer to the newbuilding condition when such switches were
not installed. It has to be assumed that B.V. either mixed up the limit switch
for the indication "visor closed", which is installed in way of the port manual
securing device or the limit switches were installed subsequently, which is
unlikely. Also the following statement of B.V. is partly wrong:
»The overall
cleating was surveyable from a mimic panel (red and green lamps for each
cleating group) both at the local control station and on the navigating
bridge; video monitoring of the car deck included a view of the ramp closure.«
The overall cleating,
i.e. locking devices, was surveyable only from a mimic panel with red and
green lamps for each cleating group located in the control station (control
panel) on car deck behind the bow ramp but not on the navi-gating bridge.
The panel on the bridge just showed one red/ one green each for visor and
bow ramp, i.e. the green lamp went on only when the visor was closed and secured,
i.e. all respective limit switches had contact. The same refers to the bow
ramp, i.e. the ramp had to be pulled tight against the rubber packings, and
all 4 securing bolts had to fully engage the mating pockets and contact the
sensors; only then would the green lamp indicate the bow ramp being closed
and secured.
Note:
According
to the wiring diagram for the locking devices the sensors of the Atlantic
lock were not connected to the bridge panel which thus initially showed
"green" when the visor was closed and just the side locks were closed. According
to Captain Haakan Karlsson this had been rectified in 1990/91 when the ferry
was taken over by Silja Line.
The remaining part
of the B.V. letter refers to the time as ESTONIA and shall be discussed in
the respective chapter.
After completion
of the newbuilding and successful trial runs B.V. issued the class certificates
and the vessel was assigned the class notations
The class
certificates for WASA KING ex SILJA STAR ex VIKING SALLY valid from July 1990
to July 1995 is attached as
Enclosure 2.4.3.45.
Upon issuance of
the said certificate with the above class notation the then valid Rules of
Bureau Veritas of 1980 did apply to VIKING SALLY. The Rules relevant for this
investigation shall hereinafter be cited and, if required, be commented.
1 - 11 Principle
of Classification
11
- Ships whose construction fully satisfies the requirements of the present
Rules, or who are deemed to fulfil the requisite conditions of strength
and safety, are registered with classification symbols, marks and notations.
12 - The classification symbols express the degree of confidence
that the ship deserves.
13 - The marks and notations give some indication on the type of
survey of construction, the type of service and navigation for which the
ship has been classed, and the special arrangements or installations on
board that add to the safety of the ship or cargo in specific conditions
of operation.
14 - Classification symbols, marks and notations are assigned or
confirmed after study of the survey reports drawn up by the Society's Surveyors
and after consulting the Classification Committee.
1 - 14 Rules
and regulations
11 -
The regulations set forth in these Rules cover ships used and loaded in
a normal manner and having a qualified crew.
1 - 21 Classification
symbols
11 -
Classification symbols comprise the division number, rating fraction and
equipment symbol. They are grouped together on certificates and in the Register
before any other mark or notation.
Consequently
the class symbol I 3/3 E etc. means the following:
I = "division
number"
For division I ships Chapter 3 and following of the present Rules set forth
the conditions for the construction and scantlings of the hull and the essential
equipment relating to propulsion and safety. In the event that same construction
or scantling requirements are not met but is deemed possible to enter the
ship in the Register, she is classed with division II.
3/3 =
The rating fraction expresses the degree of confidence the ship deserves.
Fraction 3/3 is assigned to ships in good condition (fraction 5/6 is assigned
to ships in a less satisfactory condition).
E =
The equipment symbol. It indicates that the ship's anchors and chain cables
meet the applicable requirements of the present Rules.
X=
This remark is assigned to ships built under the special survey of the Society
in compliance with the requirements of the present Rules or any others deemed
equivalent.
passenger
ferry
= 41
- The service notations of passenger ships are as follows:
- passenger ships (navire à passagers) for ships intended to carry
passengers in the meaning of the 1960 International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1960), Chapter I, rule 2, paragraphs (e) and (f),
when they meet the requirements of the present Rules.
- passenger ferry (transbordeur) for passenger ships, corresponding
to the definition of the preceding paragraph, specially equipped to carry
complete trains or vehicles with their loads shipped by rolling, when they
meet the requirements of the present Rules and, in particular, those of
section 11-4.
Note:
Section 11-4 deals with General - Hull structure - Car decks - Access.
deep sea
= This navigation
notation is assigned to self-propelled or non-propelled ships and units
which are capable of deep sea navigation, in any area and at any period
of the year.
Ice Class
IA
= Ship strengthened
for navigation in severe ice conditions in accordance with the Finnish-Swedish
Ice Class Rules 1971 and subsequent amendments.
This means, in summary,
as to VIKING SALLY:
- The vessel met
all conditions for the construction and scantlings of the hull and the essential
components relating to propulsion and safety.
- The vessel
was in good condition and deserved the highest degree of confidence.
- The ship's
anchors and chain cables met the applicable requirements of the present Rules.
- The ship
was built under the special survey of the Society in compliance with the requirements
of the Rules in force.
- The ship
was capable of deep sea navigation in any area and at any period of the year,
i.e. the vessel might trade worldwide around the year.
- The ship
was strengthened for navigation in severe ice conditions.
As to bow doors
Rule 11-4 requires the following:
21 - When the
ship is equipped with a bow door, to allow access to garage, the collision
bulkhead must have a removable part. This design is acceptable only above
bulkhead deck and only if the removable part has a watertightness and a
strength equivalent to those of fixed rule bulkhead. A movable access ramp
may be used for this purpose.
22 - Scantlings
of plating and stiffeners of a bow door are to be equivalent to those of
adjacent shell structure.
This means that
VIKING SALLY fully complied with the B.V. Rules for car/ passenger ferries
and could - from the class point of view - have been traded worldwide all
year round.
