As far as
it is known Margus Treu has been interrogated/interviewed 13 times,
of which
the following statements are available:
(1) on 28.09.94 at
10.30 hours by the central criminal police, Turku - Enclosure
21.2.3.261
(2) on 28.09.94
at 12.00 hours by unknown authority in Turku - Enclosure
21.2.3.262
(3) on 29.09.94
at 10.00 hours by central criminal police, Turku - Enclosure
21.2.3.263
(4) on 29.09.94 -
Notes taken by the Swedish members of the JAIC - Enclosure
21.2.3.264
(5) on 29.09.94
at 12.00 hours by the Estonian security police in Turku - Enclosure
21.2.3.265
(6) on 03.10.94
by the security police in Tallinn - Enclosure
21.2.3.266
(7) on 11.10.94
by Finnish members of the JAIC in Naantali - Enclosure 21.2.3.267
(8) on 16.10.94
by JAIC in Tallinn - Enclosure
21.2.3.268
(9) on 17.10.94 -
Notes taken by Tuomo Karppinen -
Enclosure 21.2.3.269
(10) on 08.03.95
- Interview by Jutta Rabe - Enclosure
21.2.3.270
(11) on 31.03.95
- The Landvetter Hearing - Enclosure
21.2.3.271
(12) on 28.02.96
by the Transport Investigation Office, Tallinn - Enclosure
21.2.3.272
(13) in May 1998
- Interview by Phillip Wearne -
Enclosure 21.2.3.273.
Margus Treu is one
of the three survivors considered by the JAIC to be the key witnesses and,
thus, was questioned in detail, however, in the presence of the head of the
nautical department of ESCO and safety adviser of ESTLINE, Captain Enn Neidre,
who was then still a member of the Estonian part of the JAIC and as such insisted
on participating despite the urgent requests of the Swedish and Finnish members
to stay home. When the psychological expert of the JAIC, the Swede Bengt Schager,
was interviewed by Jutta Rabe of Spiegel TV in this connection, he replied
the following:
»Q: Hannes
Kadak has withdrawn that he saw water coming in at 00.46 hrs, which he withdrew
later. He first made a very precise statement and later withdrew it.
A: Oh, yes,
you mean that statement, yes. Ah, it was revealed during the Landvetter
investigation, when I was asking him and I don't have any explanation to
what he said, but I was very curious, because first he said that he had
thought about it and wasn't sure anymore and 1 minute later he wasn't sure
at all whether he had said so at all. So, I don't know what to believe of
that. I am in the hands of the witness, sometimes.
Q: But can
it be that confusion was caused, that there were people on behalf of the
Shipping Company who were employed there, who were also attending that meeting
and Mr. Neidre was more or less like a boss for him, and people do get insecure
when being asked.
A: (nodding) Yes,
and Mr. Neidre was in full uniform as well for the first time that I
have seen it.
Q: But was
that very smart?
A: I don't
think so, but we had no option, this was the way the Estonians wanted it.
Although I had some feelings about it, he was a member of the Commission,
I could not say to him, please, I want to talk with him alone. This may
have altered some of the responses in the interview, yes.«
This means that Captain
Enn Neidre, working ashore in the ESCO administration for many years, had
without doubt deliberately put on his captain's uniform to intimidate the
crew witnesses and, looking at the answers they have given, he did it successfully.
As a consequence,
Treu said less than he had said in his initial statements and stuck to his
impossible wrong timing, on which, however, the JAIC has built up their equally
impossible casualty scenario. Margus Treu, who is indeed the key witness,
because he apparently saw on the monitor how the bow ramp was struck and broke
open, because this is what he told motorman Hannes Kadak in explanation of
the water ingress on to the car deck according to the first statement of Kadak
made on 29 September 1994 to the Finnish criminal police in Turku when he
said:
»- suddenly
the vessel heeled to starboard, he ran back to the ECR where Treu was watching
the monitor and said: "The situation is serious" or "bad" "because the
ramp has been struck and became broken." - saw on the monitor that there
were high waves on the car deck and that the water level had already reached
the height of the personal cars.«
This was not mentioned
by any of the JAIC members at the Landvetter meeting, although it concerns
one of the topics of the casualty sequence-of-events. The JAIC members instead
spent their time with intimidating Kadak to the effect that he withdrew his
initial and very precise statement "that at 00.46 hours he saw water penetrating
the bow ramp at the upper starboard corner".
In detail:
(1) on 28.09.94 at 10.03 hours by the Central Criminal Police, Turku:
- felt 3-4 heavy
bangs and when the camera turned to the bow, saw very much water entering
from that direction;
- immediate heel
of 10°-15° (from previously 1°-2°);
- there was only
water on the car deck - not in the engine room;
- the main engines
shut off - he managed to start the auxiliaries;
- they tried to
pump out the water that was entering the ship.
Note: The
above short statement implies two circumstances:
(a) when Treu felt
the heavy bangs/blows, the monitor either did not show the bow ramp (because
the system was still switched to the rotating mode) or he was somewhere else
in the ECR, thus he states: "When the camera turned to the bow, I saw very
much water entering from that direction." There might well have been some
time between him feeling the impacts and seeing the water penetrate at the
bow ramp which does not exclude that at the time of the impacts water was
already penetrating the bow ramp.
(b) Treu states
that there was only water on the car deck, not in the engine room, but goes
on to say that they tried to pump out the water that was entering the ship.
Since it is not possible to pump water from the car deck, water must have
been in some compartments in the vessel which were pumpable, i.e. 1st deck
and/or 0-deck.
(2) on 28.09.94
at 12.00 hours by unknown authority in Turku:
- ca. 01.00
hours felt 2 double, hard bangs from forward;
- 01.15 hours
saw on the monitor in the ECR that water was penetrating the car deck via
the ramp, at the same time he heard the watch A.B. report about water
on car deck;
- ca. 01.20 hours
the bridge asked whether it would be possible to create a list to port,
which it was not, because the port tank was full and the starboard one empty;
- thereafter he
established that the starboard list had already increased by 1 degree and
from that moment increased rapidly;
- at a list of
30°-35° the 2 port main engines stopped; an attempt to restart the engines
failed;
- "We continued
to make 5-6 knots."
- a moment later
the 4th engine followed by the 3rd engine also stopped; the auxiliaries
continued to produce power;
- ca. 01.30 hours
the list was 45° and also the auxiliaries stopped and the emergency generator
on deck 8 started;
- the bridge asked
whether it would be possible to pump freshwater overboard, which it was
not as there was no more power for the pumps;
- left the ECR
and reached the 8th deck via emergency exit when the list was practically
90°.
Note: This
statement was most probably made before anyone from ESCO or the JAIC had spoken
to him and can thus be considered uninfluenced. It is the only of the official
statements in which he testifies to have felt the two double, hard bangs at
about 01.00 hours. At 01.15 hours he certainly saw water entering the car
deck via the ramp, but he does not say whether he looked at the monitor straight
after the bangs. Actually water had already penetrated the ramp before 01.00
hours. If he saw it for the first time, his timing must be wrong by 13-15
minutes, unless he did not look at the monitor before because he was busy
with other matters, e.g. the starboard stabiliser. This is also confirmed
by his statement that the list at 01.30 hours was 45°, which it actually was
already at ca. 01.15 hours, whilst at 01.30 hours the vessel was on the side
or was almost on the side, as confirmed by many survivors, e.g. trainee mate
Einar Kukk who looked at his watch.
(3) on 29.09.94
at 10.00 hours by the Central Criminal Police, Turku:
- on watch since
midnight with motorman Kadak, vessel was making 15 kn;
- at 01.15 hours
the vessel was heavily shaken by 2 breakers following shortly one after
the other, never before had I experienced such heavy impacts on a vessel;
- I looked at
once at the monitor and saw water penetrating at the bow, the water ingress
was so strong that the picture became blurred due to water splashing up
to the camera;
Note: This
is not possible. It is more likely that the drencher system became activated
by some heat development which was subsequently followed by the fire alarm:
the "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" call over the loudspeaker system.
- the result was
felt at once when the vessel heeled 2°-3° to starboard.
- I heard on the
walkie-talkie the watch A.B. Silver Linde, who was making his rounds
and was then on the car deck, report to the watch officer on the bridge
that there was water on the car deck;
- within a few
minutes the list increased to 10°-15° whilst the vessel proceeded onwards
with all 4 main engines and 2 auxiliaries running, then the 4th officer
asked whether the list could be corrected by means of the port trim tank;
- as there was
possibly some space in the port trim tank due to the list, I tried to pump
some seawater into it, but the pump was just sucking air;
- after a few more
minutes the list reached 20°-25° and the main engines stopped by means of
automatic shut-down;
- I sent motorman
Kadak, who was about to panic, up together with Henrik Sillaste;
- at about 01.30
hours the list was 40°-45° and also the auxiliaries stopped;
- the officer from
the bridge asked whether it would be possible to pump out water from the
starboard freshwater tanks, which it was not as there was no more power
after the auxiliaries had shut down;
- I went up to
the emergency generator on deck 8, which was running until the vessel was
on her side and then also shut down.
Note:
(4) on 29.09.94
- Notes taken by the Swedish member of the JAIC (by Börje Stenström)
Engineer on duty (3rd engineer) (summary of hearing made in Finland):
- The speed was
about 15 knots.
- At 01.15 hours
he noted 2 very heavy wave impacts on the ship. Water was observed, heavy
water inflow, from the forward ramp, partly drenching the monitor camera.
- Vessel had 1°
starboard list from the beginning, caused by the loading. Trimming tanks
filled for compensation. List is starting to increase.
- Deck man of
the watch reports water on the car deck. List is increasing to 10°-15° within
a number of minutes.
- The bridge (4th
officer) questions if the list can be compensated by ballast water. Impossible
as water intake pipe now above the waterline, pump is only sucking air.
- List increased
to 20°-25°. Port side main engines stop due to lube oil pressure failure,
number 3 and 4 engines stop subsequently.
- The motorman
on duty is sent to the bridge to report.
- At 01.30 the
list has increased to 40°-45°. The engines driving the generators have stopped,
(emergency generator has started).
- The bridge questions
if trim could be compensated by emptying the starboard side freshwater tanks,
no more possible as no electrical power available.
(5) on 29.09.94
at 12.00 hours by the Estonian Security Police in Turku:
- ca. 01.10 hours
felt 2-3 heavy impacts at the bow;
- ca. 01.15 hours
saw water penetrating the bow ramp at both sides on to the car deck;
- at the same
time he heard the watch A.B. report water on the car deck;
- at ca. 01.20
hours the bridge asked whether it would be possible to heel the vessel to
port, which it was not; - the heel to starboard increased quickly from this
moment;
- tried to pump
more water into the port ballast tank which failed;
- sent up the
motorman and systems engineer; - at 30°-35° the port engines shut off automatically;
- at this time
they were still making 5-6 kn;
- a little later
also the 2 starboard engines shut off while the auxiliaries kept producing
electricity;
- at about 01.30
hours the heel was ca. 45° and the auxiliaries stopped while the emergency
generator started;
- bridge wanted
freshwater to be pumped overboard;
- left the ECR
when the vessel was practically on the side.
(6) on 03.10.94
by the Security Police in Tallinn:
- was in the ECR,
all 4 main engines were running and the vessel was making a speed of ca.
14.5 kn;
- on leaving port
they were able to balance the ship, but at sea a list of several degrees
to starboard developed;
- heard 2 hard
blows one after the other which did not result from wave impact;
- saw on the
monitor after the impacts that large quantities of water were being pressed
through at the sides of the ramp and under the ramp; at the ramp itself,
or at its sides, there were no sealings.
- Before the
impacts he saw also AB Silver Linde on the monitor at about 01.00 hours
or 5 minutes later.
- At the casualty
none of the main engines were running at full revolutions or full ahead.
The officers were fixing the power output.
- He informed
the officer that the engines had stopped.
- The car deck
cannot be pumped out, but there were 12 scuppers on each side leading the
water outboard.
- There were lots
of cars. No empty space. At the sides there was ca. 20-25 cm space.
- From the bridge
he received two orders:
- to pump more
water to the port side, which was impossible,
- to pump freshwater
overboard, which failed.
Note: In this
statement Treu says a lot, viz.
(7) on 11.10.94
by the Finnish members of the JAIC in Naantali:
»During the
night of the accident the "Estonia" used 4 engines at about 70 - 74% power.
The speed was almost 15 knots. Treu left the ECR at about 0130 when the
vessel listed 90°. He exited through the emergency exit by the funnel. A
wave threw him towards the lee of the ship. At this stage the ship heeled
over 90°. The stern sank first. The ship turned towards Treu. The ship sank
about 15 minutes after Treu saw water entering the car deck. Water entered
from under the ramp and along its sides. Water was thrown on to the video
camera which is mounted in the roof of the car deck on the central casing
bulkhead.«
(8) on 16.10.94
by JAIC in Tallinn:
»Treu was employed
on board the "Estonia" as 3rd Engineer and had the 00.00-04.00 watch. The
speed before the accident was 14.7 knots. The rpm's of the engines before
they stopped was 500 rpm, which means 10-11 knots with normal pitch on the
propellers. (On the wreck the pitch was found to be about 70%.) Normal speed
was about 580-600 rpm's. The stabilisers were deployed at 00.30. Treu did
not notice the ship turning before or during the heeling over. He saw Silver
Linde on the ECR monitor at about 01.00. Treu heard on the walkie-talkie
how Silver Linde reported to the bridge at 01.15 that there is water on
deck 1.
At
that stage Linde was on deck 7 distributing lifevests and only 9 minutes
later he was already in the liferaft. When Treu selected a view of the bow
ramp for the TV monitor, the same picture was also transmitted to the bridge.
Did anyone there watch the monitor? He noticed water entering under high
pressure along both sides of the ramp. From the monitor he could not see
if water also entered over the top of the ramp. "Mr. Skylight" was sounded
at 01.20-01.21. The port side engines stopped at about 01.20-01.25. At 01.30
Treu looked at his watch, the aux.'s stopped, the heel was 70°-75°, he left
the ECR and on leaving checked the operation of the emergency generator.
Treu got in the water on the starboard side, meaning in practice the funnel
side of the heeled ship from which the wind and the waves came, i.e. the
south-west side. In the raft he noted that as the ship sank her bows turned
toward him, i.e. to the right. The ship sank at 01.45-20.00.«
Note: Now
the Silver Linde report "water on car deck" at about 00.45 hours
has been replaced by Silver Linde reporting "water on 1st deck",
which he also did, but much later, when he was finally on deck 7 after the
big heel, i.e. probably at 01.05 hours.
According to page 175 of the protocol of the hearing on 17.10.94 (only this
page is available) Treu stated:
»Treu: I did not see Linde but I heard his report to the bridge that water
was entering at about 01.1 hours.
Q: What
did he report? Treu: Bridge from watch-keeping seaman, there is water on the
car deck.«
Why should
the Estonian A.B. sailor Linde speak in English to the Estonian 2nd officer
Kannussaar on an Estonian vessel? This is highly questionable, in particular
in the light of the fact that Silver Linde could speak very little English,
if at all, in subsequent interviews.
(9) on 17.10.94
- Notes taken by Tuomo Karppinen:
»Watch Estonian
time 24.00-04.00. Speed after 2400 was about 14.7-15 knots. Shortly after
the accident the speed was reduced. Port ME before the accident was running
at 560 rmp's. After the accident it was running at 500 rpm's and the speed
was 10-11 knots. Treu did not note any vibrations, indicating that the vessel
was turning after the accident. According to the ETA-Pilot the normal speed
of the vessel was 580-600 rpm's. Linde was seen on the monitor at 01.00,
coming from the pumping station for the visor and ramp. The bridge ordered
us to pump ballast when the ship had heeled. When the ME's and Aux's stopped
the bridge asked if we could pump out freshwater. 01.20 or 01.21 "Mr. Skylight".
01.20-01.25 ME's stopped due to heel. First Port, then Stb'd ME's stopped
due to low oil pressure. Treu left the ECR at 01.30-01.32 when the Aux's
had stopped. On (=when looking at) the monitor the ramp seemed to be in
its correct position when water entered the car deck around the (ramp) edges.
The 4th Engineer had the watch 20.00-24.00 on the Estonian coast. He may
have information on the vessel's speed. The ship started heeling when water
entered the car deck. When Treu left the ECR the list was 70°-75°. Treu
did not observe any heel of the vessel first to one and then to the other
side, for instance first to Stb'd and then P and finally back to Stb'd.
The ship was thus according to Treu heeling to Stb'd at all times. The 3rd
Engineer always had the 00.00-04.00 watch. The propeller pitch could be
seen from the ECR. Treu did not observe any change in pitch. When the ship's
stern sank the vessel came towards Treu. Treu was in the water on the Stb'd
side by the funnel. When he got into a lifeboat the ship's stern was already
deep down. The ship was upright (same Finnish word for upright = stern down
/ stern up, as for upright = no heel, Peter's note). The lights went out
at 01.30. The emergency generator functioned at greater angles of heel than
the Aux's. The lube oil level in the engines was higher than normal. The
emergency generator stopped when the heel was great, almost 90°. When the
emergency generator stopped the accumulator batteries took over. There was
light until the vessel sank. Treu did not see Linde except on the monitor,
but overheard his report to the bridge. Treu is positive that Linde reported
to the bridge. Treu cannot estimate when the vessel sank, maybe at 01.45-02.00.
Linde reported water on the car deck at 01.15. He did not say how much or
how the water was entering the car deck. Treu kept the camera fixed on the
bow ramp. There were no observations of water on the lower passenger deck.
When the camera showed the bow ramp the same picture was also displayed
on the bridge monitor on the Stb'd side of the chart room. Water entered
the car deck along the sides of the ramp under great pressure. Water flew
all the way on to the video camera lens. Treu did not observe water leaking
along the upper edge of the ramp. Partly the upper part of the ramp was
visible on the monitor. Treu was not able to say whether he could have observed
water entering along the upper edge. The stabilising fins were deployed
at 00.30.«
(10) on 08.03.95
- Interview by Jutta Rabe:
Q: When did
you note that something unusual was going on?
A: Some minutes
before 01.15 hours I heard strong bangs (2-3).
Q: Did you
note anything before that time?
A: No, I did
not hear anything unusual. I also saw that the watch A.B. was on the car
deck at about 01.00 hours going his usual round. It was Silver Linde.
Q: What did
you do at the moment of the bangs?
A: I went to
the monitor to have a look, because I thought that the cars could have moved.
From the monitor one can see the car deck from 4 different views.
Q: What did
you see?
A: I saw that
water penetrated the bow ramp and was smashing against the camera.
Q: How?
A: The water
smashed with pressure against the camera.
Q: Any communication
to the bridge?
A: I heard
on my walkie-talkie that the watch A.B. told the bridge that water had entered
the car deck.
Q: Was Silver
Linde then still on the car deck?
A: I heard from
the voice that it was Silver Linde, but could not see him anymore.
Q: What communication
did you or your colleagues have to the bridge?
A: At this
moment I did not take up communication with the bridge. I understood that
the bridge was aware of the situation and the bridge did not communicate
to me.
Q: Contacted
by the bridge at any time?
A: Yes,
they did, about 10 minutes later, "Mr. Skylight" alarm had already been
announced when they were asking whether ballast could be pumped from one
tank to another.
Q: When was
the "Skylight" call?
A: That was
probably 01.23/25 hours and shortly thereafter they asked for the ballast
water pumping. We were unable to do that because the list was that large
that we could not do it.
Q: Who asked
from the bridge?
A: The 4th officer.
Q: When did
you get out of the engine room?
A: I believe
it was 01.30 hours. I am pretty sure it was 01.30 hours and the list was
70°-80° because any minute the vessel was on her side.
(11) on 31.03.95
- The Landvetter Hearing:
The Estonian Commission
member, Captain Enn Neidre, attended against the strong objections of the
Finnish and Swedish members in a captain's uniform.
Treu:
»At 01.15 I
felt 2 strong blows not caused by waves. I was in the ECR and thought it
was some truck that had started to move. I went to the monitor and looked
at different pictures and then it showed the forward part. There I saw that
water was penetrating between ramp and hull at such high pressure that the
camera was hit. I realised that the vessel rolled 3° to starboard and 1.5°
to port and the next time much more to starboard and upright and then a
very heavy heel to starboard. Then I heard Silver Linde's voice on the
walkie-talkie that water was entering. I left the bow camera on and
then Kadak and Sillaste entered.
Between
01.20-01.25 the bridge asked whether it was possible to pump over
ballast, which it was not. The port main engines had shut off already. Tried
to restart them, but in vain. This was at about the time of the first "Mr.
Skylight" and 1 minute later the lifeboat alarm was given.
Thereafter I ordered Kadak and Sillaste to leave the engine room. This was
at 01.30 when also the auxiliaries stopped.
Next the bridge asked whether it would be possible to pump freshwater overboard
which it was not because there was no more power for the pumps.
I informed the bridge that I was also going up now to check the emergency
generator, which stopped after a short while when the vessel was on the
side and the batteries took over the supply of the emergency lights. The
main engines shut off at a heel angle of more than 45° and less than 70°.
The auxiliaries stopped at a heel of 70° and the emergency generator at
90°.
It took maximal 10 minutes from the time the auxiliaries stopped to being
in the water.
At 01.35/40 I left the engine room.
Apparently the engine output as well as the pitch had been reduced before
the big heel.
It is possible that the port engines did not shut off automatically, but
were stopped from the bridge.
There has always been maintenance work by the crew to the visor, bow ramp
and locking devices as well as hydraulic cylinders for which 2nd engineer
Peeter Tüür was responsible.
Elmar Siegel saw the emergency lifeboat No. 1 - starboard side, the first
boat - after the heel in the water with lights on driving away without caring
for those in the water. «
Note: This
was also seen by the passenger Thure Palmgren. »The stabilisers are pulled
in automatically if the speed is below 4 kn.«
Among other things
Treu made some new statements as to the stabilisers:
»Margus Treu:
Yes, it was so that at 00.30 hours they had activated the stabilisers
and it is so that if the speed drops below 4 knots the stabilisers move in
auto-matically.
Olle Noord:
This was not my question. The speed has in this case never been below 4 knots.
Margus Treu:
This I cannot say, but I draw your attention to the underwater videos which
show that the stabilisers are in.
Olle Noord:
There is evidence that they had been activated. At port side a fin was
seen ...
Margus Treu:
I do not believe this.«
The above indicates
that Treu, who is probably the only one to know exactly what happened, does
not believe that the stabilisers were out, at least not during the final stage
when the speed had dropped below 4 knots. It is the only indication in one
of the official documents that there might have been something wrong with
the stabilisers, because N&T/ ESCO and the crew remain silent on this, which
indicates that there might be some connection with the casualty.
In the book
by Andi Meister, the Chairman of the JAIC until July 1996, it is stated in
Chapter 7 on page 134:
»At about 00.35
hours the watch engineer went into the engine room in order to get the stabilisers
in operation. At 00.30 hours the watch officer on the bridge activated the
stabilisers in accordance with the master's instructions, however, one fin
did not follow (did not move out).«
It is not stated
what was done to rectify the problem, but Margus Treu told the English journalist
Phillip Wearne in May 1998 that there had been a "stabiliser alarm" at about
00.30 hours, when the bridge tried to activate the stabilisers. It concerned
the starboard fin which did not move out and it took him and Sillaste ca.
5 minutes to activate this fin.
Andi Meister
told Phillip Wearne subsequently that Henrik Sillaste did not confirm the
above and has refused to talk about it. Sillaste told the journalist, however,
that there had been major problems with the starboard stabiliser during the
installation when the vessel had been in drydock at Naantali the last time,
among other things; there had been a fire. The damage caused had to be repaired
during the already very short time available and the vessel sailed as planned,
however, without everything in way of the starboard stabiliser installation
being carried out in accordance with good workmanship as it should have been.
In this connection
two remarks have to be made:
1.) At the time
of the casualty DIANA II was in the process of being taken over by N&T/ESCO
in Rostock. Some Estonian crew members were already on board, also Captain
Erik Moik as well as the representative of the Turku Repair Yard responsible
for the installation of the stabilisers on the ESTONIA. This man had become
very stressed upon hearing about the ESTONIA casualty, but then became very
relaxed when it was reported that the visor had broken off.
2.) One of the divers
spoke to a member of SEA and indicated that it is known why the casualty really
happened, viz. something relevant had been only "spot welded" instead of fully
welded and the element could thus not withstand the forces acting on it.
During the analysis
of the statements of the survivors from deck 1 the possibility that the starboard
stabiliser fin broke off and tore open the empty starboard heeling tank and/or
the auxiliary engine room compartment will have to be borne in mind, in particular
since recent reports from Tallinn state that there had been a lot of water
in the engine room which they had been unable to pump out.
In summary:
»His time
scheme becomes totally impossible when as during the detailed questioning
at Landvetter he reconfirms: "... the last time I looked at the clock
was at 00.30 hours (note: Swedish time) and then the auxiliaries had just
stopped."
This, however, is not possible, because Andres Tammes had told the SILJA
EUROPA in the course of the distress communi-cation already at 01.25 hours
that they had a blackout and therefore could not state their position.
But there cannot be a 'blackout' as long as the auxiliaries are running.
Even the Estonian Commission admitted that "there has to be something
wrong with Treu's statements as to the times, apparently in connection
with the alarm clock (in the engine room) ... there is a mistake of between
5 and 8 minutes ...".«
- The psychologist
Bengt Schager, expert to the Swedish part of the JAIC, also stated:
»Margus Treu's
exactness in question of times is questionable ... Margus Treu is about
10 minutes too late in his time statements.«
- In the opinion
of this 'Group of Experts' his timing at least 15 minutes late, and his
loyalty towards Estline is also demonstrated by the obvious fact that in
none of his statements does he say anything about his observation why the
bow ramp was slightly open thus enabling water to penetrate the gaps at
both sides from the full visor on to the car deck, viz. just what he told
Hannes Kadak after Kadak entered the ECR following the abrupt heeling to
starboard: "Tillständet är allvarligt" eller "dälig", "efterson rampen
har slagit sönder." This translated means: "The situation is dangerous/serious,
because the ramp has been struck and become broken."
- It is amazing
that the JAIC has ignored this important observation which, fortunately,
Kadak testified in his first, obviously uninfluenced, statement. Instead
the JAIC has endeavoured, successfully, to weaken Kadak's precise statement
(Enclosure
21.2.5.284) that he saw water penetrating the bow ramp at the starboard
upper side already at 00.46 hours, which is most likely the truth bearing
in mind the full visor and the conditions of the bow ramp (see statement
2nd engineer Peeter Tüür dated 03.10.94 - Enclosure
12.5.183 - and see also Chapter 16).
- The most probable
explanation for Treu's observation that the bow ramp was struck and became
broken can be found in Chapter 32.
(12) on 28.02.96
by the Transport Investigation Office, Tallinn:
- at 01.13 there
were 2 bangs which caused him to look at the clock, thereafter he saw water
penetrating through the ramp and simultane-ously he heard Silver Linde reporting
by walkie-talkie that water was penetrating the 1st deck;
- earlier - at
00.55-00.59 hours - he had seen Silver Linde at the ramp, but then there
had been no water;
- when the auxiliary
engines stopped he decided to leave via the funnel, at that time
the heel was 40°-45°, it must have been 01.25 hours;
- already earlier
he had sent up Hannes Kadak and Henrik Sillaste the same way;
- it took him
2-3 minutes to reach the emergency generator room;
- when he reached
the open deck the heel was 70°-75°;
- when he was
still in the ECR he heard "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2", thereafter
the boat alarm with signals; at that time the vessel was heeling more than
20°;
- he was still
in the ECR when the auxiliaries shut off and the emergency generator
started; the vessel's heel was then 40°-45°;
- he was in the
emergency generator room when the emergency generator stopped and
the batteries took the power supply, the vessel then was heeling about 75°;
- the vessel was
on the side when he went into the water.
(13) in May 1998
- Interview by Phillip Wearne:
- came already
down to engine room at 23.30 and checked everything;
- at 00.30 the
stabilisers were activated;
- at 01.13 he
felt strong blows, went to the monitor and saw that water was pressing through
the sides of the ramp;
- the water came
through at both sides of the ramp and then he heard Silver Linde saying
on the walkie-talkie that there is water on the car deck; the next
thing he did was to switch the camera to the fore part of the car deck where
he could see the water coming in, he stayed there waiting for orders and
advice from the bridge;
- then the big
heel came and he watched the monitor only for a few moments because
he had to concentrate on keeping the engines running as long as possible;
- he did not report
to the bridge what he saw on the monitor, because only a few seconds after
seeing it he heard Silver Linde report water on the car deck;
- at 01.18 the
heel was so big that the main engines stopped, first the port and then the
starboard side, thereafter he sent Henrik Sillaste and the motorman up and
maybe one or two minutes later also the auxiliaries shut off and he also
left for the 8th deck;
- apart from the
fact that the port ballast tank was full and the starboard one empty it
had just been a normal heavy weather voyage;
- the heel
was 25°-30° when the port main engines stopped and after half or one
minute also the starboard side stopped;
- at that time
the monitor had already fallen down, with a big crashing noise, and
the only and last thing he had seen on it was the water being pressed through
along both sides of the bow ramp which was spraying on to the camera, thereafter
he did not look to the monitor anymore;
- left the
engine room around 01.28/30 when it was already dark and the floor had
changed to being the wall;
- when he looked
at the monitor for the last time, i.e. before the main engines shut off,
which they did at a heel of 25°-30°, the ramp was still in place.
In summary of
the thirteen statements made by Margus Treu the following can be concluded:
