21.2.4
Summary of testimonies by system
engineer Henrik Sillaste

 

Henrik Sillaste has been interrogated - as far as is known to this 'Group of Experts' - 10 times, viz.

(1) on 28.09.94 at 10.03 hours by the Finnish criminal police in Turku - Enclosure 21.2.4.274 with office translation.

(2) on 28.09.94 at 20.30 hours by the criminal police in Turku - Enclosure 21.2.4.275.

(3) on 29.09.94 by the Estonian police in Turku - Enclosure 21.2.4.276 with office translation.

(4) on 29.09.94 by members of the JAIC (the statement is not available.)

(5) on 04.10.94 by the Estonian security police in Tallinn - Enclosure 21.2.4.277.

(6) on 10.03.95 he was interviewed by Jutta Rabe and a member of this 'Group of Experts' in Stockholm when he also made a very important drawing. The transcript - translated into English - is attached as Enclosure 21.2.4.278. The complete interview which was also attended by motorman Tanel Moosaar is available on 4 video cassettes.

(7) on 13.01.96 by the Estonian police at Tallinn when he repeated the drawing he had made during the interview on 10.03.95 - Enclosure 21.2.4.279.

(8) in July 1996 he was again interviewed by a consultant to this 'Group of Experts', this time in Tallinn. The transcript - translated into English - is attached as Enclosure 21.2.4.280. The complete interview is available on video cassette.

(9) in April 1998 - Interview by the German journalist Christian Jungbluth - Enclosure 21.2.4.281.

(10) in May 1998 - Interview by the English journalist Phillip Wearne - Enclosure 21.2.4.282.

In addition, Henrik Sillaste had made various statements to journalists, viz.

- The first one was published already on 28.09.94 at 15.57 hours Finnish time: »According to an Estonian machine operator, Henrik Sillaste, who managed to escape from the ship through a funnel, the gate of the car deck was for some reason left slightly open and water came to the deck through it. The body of water, weighing many tons, that got inside the ferry made it very unstable, and the wind and the size of the waves (according to the reports as high as 10 metres) were enough to push the ship to its side.«

- On 29.09.94 the following was published in a Helsinki newspaper:

Motorman Henrik Sillaste (25), translation:

»Soon after midnight "Estonia's" forepart sunk heavily. I watched the car deck via the video control system and saw that water rushed in through the bow door, which earlier has had problems. At this moment the water already stood knee-deep on the car deck. Thereafter "Estonia" rapidly listed over. The 2 main engines stopped soon thereafter, but the auxiliary engines were still running.«

Sillaste has maintained this observation, viz. that the bow ramp was slightly open when he looked at the monitor for the first time in the Engine Control Room (ECR), during all his statements. Although he is expressing himself very carefully and has, after the first three statements taken on 28/29 September 1994 at Turku, obviously been prepared for possible further questioning concerning the visor and its locking devices, however, apparently not in respect of the bow ramp. Also the fact that he was not invited to attend the Landvetter meeting at the end of March 1995 indicates that neither JAIC nor ESCO did consider him to be a key witness. This apparently changed after this 'Group of Experts' had presented his detailed evidence, including the drawing he had made showing the slightly open bow ramp with water pressing through at both sides, to JAIC in the course of the joint meetings held during the second half of 1995.

Already in January 1996 he was again interrogated by the Estonian security police when he made another drawing showing the same condition of the slightly open bow ramp with water pressing through at both sides. Both drawings are shown below.

 

 

 

 

 

In detail Henrik Sillaste has testified concerning his relevant observations:
(1) on 28.09.94 at 10.03 hours by the Finnish criminal police in Turku

- was in the engine control room (ECR) with 3rd engineer and motorman;
- ship turned on the side within 20 minutes;
- saw cars moving on car deck;
- got on deck when the list was 75°-80°;
- lifeboat lashings had been released in advance;
- water was entering through the bow (ramp).

 

(2) on 28.09.94 at 20.30 hours by the criminal police in Turku,

attended by :
- Simo Aarnio
- Finnish Commission and F.B.N.
- Estonian Ambassador as interpreter

- ca. 00.30 hours was called by 3rd engineer Treu to come down to repair the vacuum system;

- went down in the foreship to 0-deck to find out the cause for the problem;

- felt several hard shocks in the hull which he considered to result from wave impact although they were quite heavy;

- he had found the cause of the problem when the vessel heeled to starboard;

- he went to the engine control room (ECR) where Treu and motorman Kadak were;

- looked on the monitor which showed forward, aft and both sides of the car deck;

- saw water penetrating the forward part through the bow ramp, water penetrated in large quantities at both sides of the ramp and we were discussing whether the visor had been lost;

- there was so much water penetrating that it could not just be a question of damage to the packings, water was streaming in all the time, not just when the bow was diving into a wave;

- the vessel heeled then 30°-40° and the main engines stopped one after the other;

- at a heel of 45°-50° he and Kadak went up when the auxiliaries were still running;

- when he was on deck 6 the auxiliaries stopped, the electricity went off and returned after some seconds after the emergency generator had started;

- Treu had informed the bridge that water was entering the vessel and that the bilge pumps were running and pumping out water;

- it took 15-20 minutes from the moment he saw water entering the car deck to the sinking of the ferry.

 

(3) on 29.09.94 by the Estonian police in Turku:

- ca. 00.30 hours called down to 0-deck due to the alarm system being out of function;

- went down to 0-deck in the engine room area and found the cause to be lack of vacuum;

- started to work and believes it took him ca. 20-25 minutes to find that out while the vessel was labouring and shaking quite heavily in the sea state;

- when he was just about to establish the cause for the vacuum, he felt 2-3 really heavy shocks in the hull and the panel installation began to shake on the spring suspension;

- then the vessel heeled slightly and some drums moved to the side after one of the heavy bangs,

- after the next heavy bang the drums, which had been standing still, in the meantime moved to the other side;

- he understood that something was wrong and rushed up to the ECR;

- he reached this room after one max. two minutes after he heard the first of the heavy bangs;

- when he asked Treu and Kadak what was going on he heard water rushing on to the car deck;

- he looked at the monitor which showed the bow part and saw large quantities of water penetrating;

- ca. 1 minute later the watertight doors were closed;

- at a heel of 30°-35° the starboard main engines stopped;

- at a heel of 40° all main engines had stopped;

- at a heel of 45°-50° he went up with Kadak via the emergency exit inside the engine casing;

- at deck 6 level the auxiliaries stopped and the emergency generator started;

- reached deck 8 through the boiler room when the heel was 70°-75°;

- after the whistle signal, the 3rd and 2nd mates left the bridge and climbed down to help opening liferafts.

 

(4) on 04.10.94 by the Estonian security police in Tallinn:

- 00.30 hours got message in his room that the vacuum had disappeared;

- believes to have been in the engine room at 00.45 hours;

- after ca. 25 minutes work, thus after 01.00 hours, he left;

- nothing abnormal in the engine room;

- after the bangs the panel began to shake an the heel occurred which due to following wave impacts increased quickly;

- went to the ECR and asked Treu why water was entering which he could see on the monitor;

- got no answer;

- heel was 45° and the engines stopped, the coded fire alarm "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" was sounded, the watertight doors were closed and boat alarm given;

- upon instructions of Treu I left via the engine casing and on deck 6 level the auxiliaries stopped and the emergency generator started;

- came up to deck 8 when the heel was 80°;

- he would like to make clear, that

(a) he left the engine room only after 25 minutes when the vessel did not right up;
(b) he did not see water entering the car deck himself, Treu said that to him.

 

(5) on 10.03.95 interviewed by Jutta Rabe:

- 00.30 hours called down;

- 20-25 min. later 2 heavy impacts followed by the heel, this was at 01.00 hours or a little later;

- rushed to ECR which took maybe 3-5 minutes, thus it happened after 01.00 hours;

- looked at the monitor and saw water penetrating at both sides of the bow ramp, thinks more at starboard (made drawing);

- vessel listed more and more like the hand of a watch in steps, main engine stopped;

- up at a heel of 45°/50° and when between decks 5/6 blackout and light back after some seconds (auxiliaries had stopped);

- after the main engines had stopped the Reception girl called "Alarm" several times in a crying voice, thereafter followed the "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" call from the bridge.

 

(6) on 13.01.96 by the Transport Investigation Office, Tallinn:

- ca. 00.45 hours left his cabin for the engine room;

- was told that the control lights of the vacuum system indicated problems and he worked on it for 15-25 minutes when he heard a hard bang which was not caused by wave impact and within less than 1 minute another bang, which until today he cannot fully explain;

- thereafter the vessel heeled and did not right up again;

- he went to the ECR and met Treu and Kadak about 1-2 minutes after the first bang;

- Treu received instructions from the bridge to right the vessel up, which was not possible;

- upon instructions of Treu he checked the car deck via the cameras of the monitor, the trucks were standing in position;

there was no water except at the bow ramp where the water was pressing through at the sides;

- he was certain that Treu had seen this before himself;

- they did not look at the monitor together;

- he made a drawing to demonstrate what he saw - this drawing is attached to his statement (Note: see pages 476/477);

- tried to phone Leiger (chief engineer), but the telephone fell down, the table had already been torn off its welded foundation and was no more in place;

- when he looked away from the monitor two of the four main engines had shut already off and the other two were about to stop as well, also the secondary consumers shut off due to overload;

- the heel was about 30° and Treu then sent him and Kadak up;

- they reached deck 8 via the boiler room; there they met Arvi Rohumaa, Silver Linde, Victor Psjenitjnyj;

- when he was still in the engine room and the heel was 20°-30° he heard "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" and the alarm from the Information desk;

- when they were between decks 4 and 6 the emergency generator started, the vessel heeled then 60°-80°;

- at 01.27 hours he was together with Hannes Kadak, Silver Linde and others in the liferafts.

 

(7) in July 1996 interviewed in Tallinn:

- was phoned after 12.00 hours to check the vacuum system;

- when he was down on 0-deck there were 2-3 strong bangs, different to wave bangs, he was surprised how strong they were, they followed more quickly as waves do one after the other;

- then the ferry heeled and did not right up again - realised that something was wrong and rushed to the ECR;

- saw water penetrating the bow ramp at both sides;

- it could be seen that the bow ramp was closed, but the water penetrated at the sides no matter what the vessel did;

- shortly later the main engines shut off automatically due to the increasing heel;

- also the auxiliaries shut off and the emergency generator took over after only seconds;

- first there was the coded alarm for the crew "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" and then from the Information desk - very desperate - "Alarm, alarm".

 

(8) in April 1998 - Interview by Christian Jungbluth:

- there were 3 bangs, most of the others forget the first one, which was the weakest one, there were about 30 seconds between them, and the 3rd one was the strongest;

- he assumes that the vessel righted up again after the 1st and 2nd bangs (he calls the "bangs" "beats" or "blows" and associates each "bang" with a heeling movement, the bangs came from forward;

- after the 3rd most heavy bang the vessel heeled excessively to starboard and the plastic containers slid down to the starboard side and he rushed to the ECR;

- he did not see water penetrate the bow ramp, saw only the roofs of the cars, never saw water as long as he was in the ECR;

- when he entered the ECR 2 of the 4 main engines had shut off already;

- the water tight doors were closed;

- tried to phone chief engineer Leiger, but could not reach the telephones which had both fallen down;

- thinks he was there only 5 min. before he went up together with Kadak.

 

(9) in May 1998 - Interview by Phillip Wearne:

- there were 3 strong blows, following one after the other but much quicker than wave blows do and which were different to wave blows;

- after the 3rd blow the ship heeled quite heavily and he knew that something must be wrong;

- rushed towards the ECR;

- looked at the monitor and saw water rushing in at both sides of the bow ramp, the first thought was that something was wrong with visor and bow ramp;

- then 2 of the 4 main engines had already stopped, then there was an attempt to pump the ballast but this was a failure;

- the heel increased continuously clicking like the second hand of a wrist watch;

- next also the other 2 main engines stopped while the auxiliaries continued to run;

- tried to contact the chief engineer but telephone had fallen down;

- just before the auxiliaries shut off there was the "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" message followed by the general alarm;

- he refers to what he said right after the accident, he might mix up things now;

- when they were between the 4th/6th deck the electricity went off and 2-3 seconds later the emergency generator started to work and they continued to deck 8, had problems opening the door at the port side because the heel was already some 70° and it was above their heads, managed finally to open the door by pressing their backs against it;

- the emergency exit was well constructed by the yard, it was quite narrow, thus they could lean with their backs against the left wall and climb all the way up, if it had been wider, they would have just fallen down;

- saw 2nd/3rd mates leaving the bridge after the Tyfon signal - did not see them again;

- ran (after the heel) through the auxiliary engine room, the storage room, main engine room and in these 4 rooms there was no water.

 

In summary of Henrik Sillaste's various statements the following has to be concluded:
Due to his observations and respective statements Henrik Sillaste is one of the key witnesses of the case. His statement: "that the bow ramp was only slightly open at a time when the vessel had already heeled abruptly to starboard" is crucial for the cause consideration, because obviously the big heel had not been caused "by large quantities of water flooding onto car deck through the bow ramp having been pulled open by the forward tumbling visor" as alleged by the JAIC.
Also his timing was quite good in the first statements but was changed possibly as consequence of influence of his principals, as evidenced by his statement taken by the Estonian security police on 04.10.1994.
As a matter of fact, it was Henrik Sillaste who told a member of this 'Group of Experts' in March 1995 that all the crew survivors had been threatened to be immediately sacked by ESCO if they said anything against ESCO's interests to Commission members, journalists or other interested parties and this had scared all the of the crew survivors considerably.
Nevertheless, in addition to the aforementioned statements about the slightly open bow ramp he has made a number of interesting remarks:

- The lifeboat lashings had been released in advance, which means that the vessel's command had been aware for some time before the big heel at 01.02 hours that the ferry was in danger of sinking.

- The heavy impacts - three in total, of which not everyone had felt the first one, but which he had, having been so close - were not caused by waves

- When he came to the ECR two of the four main engines had already stopped, i.e. at ca. 01.03/04 hours, and the other two followed shortly afterwards, the watertight doors were closed and the bilge pumps were running. (Since bilge pumps can only pump from sections below the car deck, i.e. 1st deck or 0-deck, they must have pumped from one or both of these decks.)

- He could not phone the chief engineer since the telephone had fallen down which - according to Treu - also the monitor showing the bow ramp had done at some stage.

- He and Kadak left the ECR upstairs already after having been there for only 5 minutes. Then all four main engines had stopped already, but the diesel generators were still running, possibly for another 1 or 2 minutes. This means that the main engines had stopped already at about 01.10 hours or earlier and the diesel generators stopped at about 01.12 hours, whereafter the emergency generator in the funnel had started automatically, which among other things was also supplying power to the bilge pumps.

- Just before the diesel generators stopped he heard the "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" alarm, which consequently must have been at about 01.10/01.11 hours.

The testimony of Henrik Sillaste further proves that the visor was full of water and remained full, respectively refilled time and again, because water continued to stream on to the car deck no matter whether the bow was diving into waves or not.
The apparent fact that there was something wrong with the vacuum system at about 00.30 hours is confirmed by the statement of Anneli Konrad, one of the dancing girls, who has testified, inter alia:

"At about 00.30 hours my performance was over and I was on my way to my cabin. I went wrong and ended up on the 2nd car deck where I heard a crash. I found my cabin finally feeling very sick. There was no water in the toilet."

The complete statement is attached as Enclosure 21.2.4.283.