3.2.2
Seakeeping behaviour

• The vessel was rolling softly in beam sea, but pitching hard in head sea and took over lots of spray water, the speed had to be reduced in time before green water was taken on the forecastle (visor).
• The vessel was reacting sensitively to beam wind, took up quickly permanent heel, e.g. Beaufort 6 - 7 from port side would create a starboard list of 2°- 3°.
• The anchors were sitting tight in the pockets. No banging was heard when the vessel was pitching in head seas.

3.2.3
Proceeding through ice

• On the route from Turku to Stockholm ice is usually met more frequently and longer compared to the route Tallinn-Stockholm, because the ice inside the archipelago grows faster and disappears later. If, however, the Gulf of Finland respectively the Baltic is covered by ice the route Tallinn-Stockholm is much more difficult and problematic in comparison to proceeding through ice in the archipelago, because the ice at sea is much heavier and thicker. The ice moves with wind and/or current, ice channels open and close quickly, wind and current press the ice floes together and on top of each other, thereby creating ice barriers of several meters thickness.
• The maximum speed when proceeding at sea through ice should not exceed 7-8 knots, whereby the ice pressure on the visor should always be the decisive factor.
• The risk of sustaining severe damage to the bow area and to the under-water hull, however, is most imminent if the Gulf of Finland and/or the Baltic Sea are jointly partly covered by ice and the bridge is manned by inexperienced navigators. The vessel then quickly picks up speed in free water and subsequently crashes with high speed into ice fields, thereby colliding with thick and solid ice floes.
• Also SOLAS requires the early and substantial reduction of speed near ice according to Chapter V, Regulation 7, a copy of which is attached as Enclosure 3.2.3.82.

3.2.4
Wave condition history

In the initial trading area of VIKING SALLY between Turku-Mariehamn-Stockholm the ferry never proceeded more than 14 nm from the nearest land, thus never left sheltered waters. Nevertheless according to Håkan Karlsson, one of the two long-term masters of the ferry, they experienced a couple of times hurricane force winds on the way to the Söderarm entrance when they had to hove-to for the safety of the ferry. Also in her subsequent trading areas in the Gulf of Bothnia between Vaasa and Sundsvall she met rough weather frequently according to her long-term chief engineer Lars Karlsson and the engine output was reduced repeatedly. Upon request of this 'Group of Experts' the Swedish Meteorological and the Hydrological Institute (SMHI) has studied the available weather and wave data to find out how often ESTONIA had met at least the same wind and wave conditions as she did during the casualty night.
The result is that in the Gulf of Bothnia she has met similar conditions only once, viz. on 19 December 1992. (For details see Subchapter 12.2.)

 

3.3
Boatswain Juhani Luttunen

Juhanni Luttunen had been one of the two boatswains of the vessel from June 1980 to November 1992, while Christer Koivisto had been motorman and "ombudsman" at the same time.
Luttunen, who shot Koivisto on 12 June 1996, was interviewed in the prison of Vaasa by a member of this 'Group of Experts' and has stated the following:

• His function as boatswain in connection with operating the visor/bow ramp was to stand at the control panel.
• He explained the different handles and also the indicator lights. - He remembered clearly the 2 hooks and 4 bolts of the bow ramp as well as
• the hydraulic side locks, the Atlantic lock, and also explained that they had never engaged the manual side locks.
• At some time probably in 1982 it was realised that the visor was no more closing properly because it was in a misaligned condition athwartships. He thinks that the starboard corner was standing a bit up. It was for this reason that the Atlantic lock bolt could no more move through the visor lug. The matter was discussed with the engine crew and it was considered what could be done.
• Engine repairman Koivisto considered himself to be the visor expert and offered to rectify the Atlantic lock to the effect that the bolt would fit again. Luttunen remembers that Koivisto was even called back from vacation to do the modification.
• In the presence of Luttunen and motorman Göran Lindström Koivisto cut off the upper part of the lugs of the Atlantic lock and took off the bushings. Thereafter he welded extended parts on the lug remains and the holes in the lugs now looked like an ellipse, the bushings did not fit any more and were left out as still the bolt would not go smoothly through the visor lug, which was extending apparently too much aft or too much forward. In any event Koivisto cut something off the inside of the visor lug, whereby Luttunen is of the opinion that it was from the forward part.
  After the repairs were completed they realised at once that it was impossible and decided to contact the inspector ashore. The poor modification was inspected and about one week later Swedish speaking people came from the company von Tell AB, cut off completely all 3 lugs of the Atlantic lock and welded new ones to the A-deck with bushings inserted.
  He believes also that it was then realised that there was something wrong with the hydraulic, which was adjusted. The visor lug remained - as far as he remembers - unchanged, i.e. should still be the original.
  When the repairs were completed the von Tell people expressly prohibited Koivisto or anybody else on board to ever manipulate the Atlantic lock again.

The complete interview is attached as Enclosure 3.3.83.

The statement of Juhani Luttunen that the Atlantic lock was replaced sometime in 1982/83 by Swedish speaking people, most probably from von Tell AB, was basically confirmed by Captain Håkan Karlsson having been Master of VIKING SALLY, SILJA STAR and WASA KING since commissioning of the vessel in 1980.

Note:
Before a respective statement could be drawn up and signed, Håkan Karlsson passed away on 14.03.97 due to cancer.