33.1
The "DIANA II" Incident in January 1993

As this relatively minor incident was made into a near catastrophe by the Nordic media with the visor allegedly almost lost, clarification was needed and thus the matter was also investigated by this 'Group of Experts' with the following result:
DIANA II was delivered by Meyer Werft in 1979 as forerunner and near-sister of the ESTONIA. The DIANA II as well as the VIKING SALLY (later ESTONIA) were trading in the Viking Line service between Stockholm-Mariehamn-Turku until 1990. From the chief mate Karl Ole Lindroos, who had practically been on board from the time of delivery until 1990, as well as from the mate and master Thorsten Söder, who served in this rank for many years, the following information has been received:

• It was well known to all navigators that the bow visor was the most sensitive part of the vessel and was endangered in head-on seas at too high speed.
• The visor was the responsibility of the chief mate who also opened and closed it.
• There were always problems at the time of opening and closing the bolt of the Atlantic lock, so that the bolt was finally thinned by 5 mm. After the visor had once been lowered with already closed bolt of the Atlantic lock, the bolt had to be renewed.
• Before it was possible to open the locking devices it was necessary to press the visor hydraulically down as otherwise the bolts could not have been opened respectively closed hydraulically against the pressure of the rubber packings.
• During the winter time there were always problems with the rubber packings being frozen to the visor bottom.
• It often occurred that the visor closed with a loud "bang" as the man at the operating panel could not see the respective position of the visor.
• About one year before changing from the Slite Line to the Trelleborg-Rostock Line (TR Line) the pistons of the hydraulic cylinders were newly coated.
• After the bankruptcy of Slite Line in 1992 DIANA II was taken over by TR Line on basis of a bareboat. At first the Slite crew remained partly on board. Thorsten Söder and Lennart Elfors remained masters and Karl Ole Lindroos was one of the two chief mates for several months.
• The vessel was engaged in the Rostock-Trelleborg service and made three trips daily, two of which were carried out during the daylight at full speed and one during the night with the speed reduced to ca. 12 kn.
• On the morning of 16 January 1993 during the voyage from Rostock to Trelleborg - i.e. two days after the hurricane in which the JAN HEWELIUSZ sank - there was again a storm of Bft. 10 blowing. Captain Söder was already on board the DIANA II to take-over the command from Captain Elfors after arrival in Trelleborg. The vessel proceeded through the very rough sea at ca. 12 kn. The chief mates Lindroos and Hartwigsson were on their handing-over round just in the forward part of the car deck when they noticed water leaking through the bow ramp. After the vessel had reached the shelter of the shore, both mates entered the inside of the visor through the hatch on the forecastle deck and found considerable damage to the hydraulic side locks (the manual side locks were not engaged) as well as to the Atlantic lock. After arrival the Classification Society B.V., Sjöfartsverket as well as TR Line were immediately informed and the responsible TR inspector instructed the master to have the damage repaired prior to the next departure.
• The ship's command entered the following remarks into the logbook:

  "Upon arrival Trelleborg the following damage was found to the bow visor: Locking devices out of order, starboard side lost, port side bent, Atlantic lock ca. 2-3 cm cracked, cracks in starboard side web, cracks in the starboard hinge."
  (Logbook page 6 - see Enclosure 33.1.424.)

An inspection was carried out by the B.V. surveyor Axel Gall after commencement of repairs on 16 January 1993 and after completion of same on 17 January 1993 - see the B.V. Survey Report Enclosure 33.1.425.
Accordingly the following damage was found:

- The lug for starboard lock plunger was lost;
- the lug in centre line (the "Atlantic lock") was bent and the weld cracked;
- the lug for port side plunges was bent and the weld cracked;
- a minor crack at hinge on starboard side;
- the girder in centre line and two webs on starboard side cracked.

The following repairs were carried out by Trelleborg Industri- & Byggservice AB and their invoice with working sheets is attached as Enclosure 33.1.426.

- The lug starboard side renewed with doubling plate on the back side;
- the lug in centre line faired and re-welded; the stay above the lug renewed;
- the lug port side faired and the crack chiselled and welded;
- the crack at starboard hinge chiselled and welded;
- the cracks at the girder and the webs chiselled and welded.

In the presence of the B.V. surveyor, Captain Söder informed Sjöfarts-inspektionen Malmö - Åke Sjöblom - and invited them for survey. However, due to lack of time this was allegedly not possible and Sjöblom confirmed that the survey carried out by B.V. was sufficient and the repairs would be inspected later. Actually this was performed ca. three months later by the Safety Inspector Nilsson, according to the logbook entry.

• The B.V. lawyer Johnsson from Stockholm wrote in a letter to Dr. Peter Holtappels on the incident as follows:

»According to the Captain in command of the DIANA II two officers discovered the damages at sea. For some time it had been "wet" on the forward ramp and crew members at sea went down between the forward ramp and the visor to see if the packing was leaking significantly. When they went down, the damages to the visor were discovered. On arrival at Trelleborg on 16 January 1993, they had a close look while the visor was opened. Thereafter the repairs were ordered through TR-Line in Trelleborg. The captain said that the weather had been bad for a few days, 15-25 m/s high waves, and it was dark. Thus, the damages might have happened several days before the 16 January 1993. He does not know when or under what circumstances the damages were suffered. The captain advised the chief surveyor of Malmö Inspectorate about the damages on 16 January 1993 by telephone.«

The complete letter is attached as enclosure 33.1.427.

• A comparison of the damage to the side lock lugs of DIANA II / ESTONIA is shown below.

   

  

   

 

According to the ship's command the torn off starboard lug was lost. This is possible as first the lug hangs on the bolt of the hydraulic locking device and after opening the same it falls into the water. As noticed from the letter of the B.V. lawyer Johnsson, the repairs had already been commenced when the B.V. surveyor boarded the vessel. Thus practically neither the class nor the safety board ever saw the damage in its original condition.
The ship's command was unable to attribute the damage to a special occurrence, such as a hard blow of the sea. Therefore the TR Line inspector Griesmaier is of the opinion that the damage to the locking devices occurred over a longer period. This would be in conformity with among other things the statements of the chief mate Karl Ole Lindroos.

• DIANA II remained in charter with TR Line until the end of September 1994. Since June 1994 Nordström & Thulin had become interested in the ship, in order to take her into their Stockholm-Tallinn service in addition to the ESTONIA. First inspections were carried out which included checking of the B.V. survey reports on board, thus inspector Hobro saw the B.V. report concerning the broken/cracked locks of the visor.
• After the ESTONIA sank, the take-over was quickly performed. On 29 Sept-ember 1994 in the presence of the B.V. surveyor Kirchhoff and the N&T inspector Hobro, all locking devices were opened and closed with closed visor, the indicator lights were checked and all found to be in order. The vessel remained in Warnemünde until 4 or 5 October 1994. As a consequence of the ESTONIA accident the bow visor was welded closed, however, broke open again during her subsequent voyage to Turku.
• After the take-over, Nordström & Thulin instructed Messrs. Turbo Technik of Wilhelmshaven to inspect the bow visor and its locking devices and the following was ascertained:

  - Inspection of the hinges by means of the "dye-check" method showed no cracks;
  - the play between the bolt and the lugs of the Atlantic lock was measured to be 35 mm and was different from lug to lug - including bolt / visor lug;
  - the prevailing pressure was to forward, thus the play was only aft;
  - the lugs were oval as were the bushings;
  - the bushing for the spring loaded securing bolt fitted to the bushing between the port and the centre lugs was present;
  - the visor lug was oval and fixed to a bar, running diagonally upwards. This was not in conformity with the lug as per drawing No. 48611-373;
  - at the centre and port lugs and possibly at the sensor plate there were two angle bars in athwartships direction, from where a pipe was leading to the cross beam of the 3rd stringer level of the visor;
  - below this cross beam (round) a double T-beam was fitted, probably to give the visor more transverse strength in the bow wave area (ice);
  - the sensors should have been fitted to the 2nd stringer level (mode of operation unclear at present);
  - all three lugs of the Atlantic lock had been rewelded to the forepeak deck;
  - the lug of the starboard side lock was not original.

In summary Turbo Technik concluded:

"On the whole we do not consider it safe to run the vessel under this condition."

The complete report of Turbo Technik is attached as Enclosure 33.1.428.

 

 

33.2
The "HABIB" Visor Damage on 04.10.78

Finally attention shall be drawn to one visor damage which occurred outside the Baltic Sea area in the Western Mediterranean sea. It concerns the brand new car/passenger ferry HABIB also classed by B.V. and built for the Tunisian owners Cotunav, Tunis, for service between Tunis-Genua-Marseille by the Nobiskrug Shipyard/Rendsburg in 1978. The vessel has a length of 145.73 m, a breadth of 23.51 m and a draught of 6.16 m. The service speed is 23 kn. The bow ramp was regarded as upper extension of the collision bulkhead above the bulkhead deck and connected to the visor.
On 4 October 1978 the ferry was on voyage from Tunis to Marseille when at 01.10 hours the course was changed to the west and at 02.15 hours to 320° towards Marseille; wind: West Bft. 9-10, speed 15.8 kn. From 07.00 hours onwards they were sailing under the French coast. Around 11.00 hours it was noticed that the locking devices of the bow visor had broken and the visor was set to starboard.
The visor was lashed/secured, and the voyage was continued with reduced speed to Marseille.
The visor was temporarily closed and repaired during the following yard period. The locking device system, built and installed by MacGregor, was reinforced after the occurrence.