The B.V. head
office for the Nordic countries was located in Copenhagen since 1990. The
head office for Sweden was in Gothenburg, the manager was Hans Olsson. Further,
there were B.V. offices in Trelleborg, Malmö and Stockholm whose senior and
staff surveyors reported to the Gothenburg office. Hans Olsson reported directly
to the head office in Paris.
Note: Hans
Olsson left the B.V. organisation in August 1998.
There was
also a B.V. office in Helsinki which inspected the vessel in Finland as
long as she was flying the Finnish flag. The office was no more involved
after the flag and name change to ESTONIA.
According to the
previous principal surveyor of the BV-Stockholm office, Lars Olof Ålander,
N&T had made it a condition for the ESTONIA to remain under classification
of B.V. that only one surveyor, namely his junior colleague, Anders Wirstam,
should carry out all the required surveys both in respect of class items and
the safety items to be inspected on behalf of the E.N.M.B. This was accepted
by B.V. and Anders Wirstam from the Stockholm office became the exclusive
surveyor for the ESTONIA in all respects. Upon instructions from the head
office in Paris he reported directly to the manager of the B.V. head office
for Sweden in Gothenburg, Hans Olsson, thereby bypassing the principal surveyor
Lars Olof Ålander - see also
Enclosure 2.4.3.44.2.
As mentioned
before, a contract was agreed also between B.V. and E.N.M.B. and signed already
on the 18.08.92 (see
Enclosure 6.2.114), which provided that B.V. would act as agent for the
Estonian Administration for the purpose of surveying Estonian flag ships with
classification certificates issued by B.V. in order to determine the compliance
of such vessels with the mandatory requirements of certain International Conventions
referred to in Annex 1 - which includes SOLAS 1974. As the contract had already
been running since August 1992 it has to be assumed that B.V. had already
carried out some inspections of Estonian flag cargo vessels, but was uncertain
about the requirements in respect of car/passenger ferries like the ESTONIA.
Therefore B.V. sought the assistance of Shipinspec. The approach, however,
was not made by B.V. but by S.-C. Forsberg and Ulf Hobro from N&T, although
both Hans Olsson and Anders Wirstam are ex Shipinspec employees and Wirstam
had actually been working under the head of the Stockholm office of Shipinspec,
Ulf Beijner, who was now contacted by Forsberg/Hobro.
Note:
Hans Olsson
- born in 1944 - studied marine engineering at Chalmers University, Gothenburg
from 1973-1977. Thereafter he joined Sjöfarts-verket and stayed for 13 years
until 1990 when he became head of BV-Sweden. Anders Wirstam - born 1942
- testified to having had 28 years of experience when being interrogated
in November 1994 and has been with Shipinspec Stockholm from 1966-1969 under
Ulf Beijner.
Forsberg and Hobro
contacted Ulf Beijner, then still the head of Shipinspec's inspection office
Stockholm, on 24.11.92. According to a memo made by Ulf Beijner after the
meeting they outlined their plans to replace the NORD ESTONIA by the ESTONIA,
including the new companies structures, flag of vessel, Estonian crew and
time schedule. They also asked whether Shipinspec could assist B.V. in the
take-over procedure which was promised. The respective memo by Ulf Beijner
is attached - together with an office translation - as Enclosure
6.4.117.
Accordingly
N&T did not just request assistance for B.V. in general, but also requested
that Shipinspec should carry out the so-called "2/90 inspection" after the
take-over in Tallinn, which was also accepted. This "2/90 inspection" had
then already been replaced by official "Regulation 1/92" which came into force
on 15 April 1992 by order of the then head of Shipinspec, Safety Chief, Bengt-Erik
Stenmark. Regulation 1/92 together with an office translation is attached
as Enclosure 6.4.118.
It reveals that the main issue of this regulation is fire-fighting and lifeboat
drills respectively the training of crews and passengers in respect of the
above and it is quite obvious that this regulation had been drafted under
the influence of the SCANDINAVIAN STAR catastrophe. It further reveals that
the stated controls and exercises had and have to be carried out on all Swedish
flag vessels and all other vessels calling at Swedish ports. In addition,
it is required that passenger vessels regularly calling at Swedish ports have
to undergo a "1/92 inspection" with acceptable results before the vessel takes
up service. Whilst in service the vessel has to undergo continued inspections
in intervals determined by Shipinspec, however, at least once a year.
Part of the Regulation
1/92 are the attachments 1 and 2, i.e. the "Report", and the "Guidance to
Surveyors on Procedures for Operational Control of Ships". Both are attached
as Enclosures 6.4.119
and 6.4.120.
In particular
the "Guidance to Surveyors on Procedures for Operational Control of Ships",
which draws attention to the negative role the human element has played in
shipping disasters in the past, had been developed to avoid what did take
place only 20 months later on board of MV ESTONIA, a vessel which had been
"carefully" checked by inspectors of Shipinspec before taking up her trade
and which thereafter had called at Stockholm every second day.
In any event,
in addition to those "inspections" the vessel had to be visited frequently
by the Classification surveyor Anders Wirstam since ESTONIA participated in
the "Continuous Survey System" of B.V., i.e. 1500 items had to be checked
during 5 years, viz. 300 per year. For details see Subchapter 9.1.
Further on behalf
of E.N.M.B. the same B.V. surveyor had to
- carry out the
Load Line Surveys
- examine
all certificates
- inspect
social rooms / cabins / passenger accommodations
- inspect
lifesaving and fire-fighting equipment
- inspect
navigation instruments
- issue Passenger
Ship Safety Certificate (annually), thereby confirming that the vessel met
SOLAS requirements.
Obviously quite
a substantial job for one man on a vessel like the ESTONIA. Further details
can be found in Subchapter 9.2.
After the companies'
structure had been established and the basic agreements were made quite some
activities developed between N&T and B.V. in connection with ESTONIA's documentation/certification,
and it became very obvious that N&T behaved and was treated as if they were
the owners. Nowhere in the relevant correspondence do E-Line, Estline or ESCO
appear.
Note:
The respective
files of B.V. head office, Paris could only be sighted very briefly and
only until 16 June 1994.
Due to the change
of flag and also because Estonia is signatory to the SOLAS Convention the
vessel had to comply with a number of amendments to SOLAS 1974, which she
apparently did not or, at least, B.V. and N&T were uncertain whether she did.
They found
out, for example, that in 1985 the duck tail had been fitted and that at the
end of 1990/beginning of 1991 ca. 85 ts. of steel plates had been built-in
in way of the accommodation and that subsequently an inclining experiment
was carried out by Ship Consulting Oy, Turku, because according to SOLAS -
Chapter II-1, Regulation 22, paragraph 2, the following is required:
»2 Where any
alterations are made to a ship so as to materially affect the stability
information supplied to the master, amended stability information shall
be provided. If necessary the ship shall be re-inclined.«
In addition, since
1991 SOLAS requires in paragraph 3 of the same regulation:
»3 At periodical
intervals not exceeding five years, a lightweight survey shall be carried
out on all passenger ships to verify any changes in lightship displacement
and longitudinal centre of gravity. The ship shall be re-inclined whenever,
in comparison with the approved stability information, a deviation from
the lightship displacement exceeding 2% or a deviation of the longitudinal
centre of gravity exceeding 1% of L is found or anticipated.«
The full wording
of SOLAS - Chapter II-1, Regulation 22, is attached as Enclosure 6.4.121.
Based on the results
of the inclining experiment carried out in January 1991 Ship Consulting Oy
drew up a revised "Trim and Stability Booklet" dated 20.01.91, which was stamped
"Approved" by the F.B.N. on 23.01.91 and which is attached as Enclosure 3.4.86.
It is based on the initial one provided by Meyer Werft for the newbuilding
VIKING SALLY. Ship Consulting Oy, however, found that the centre of gravity
(CG) - in their opinion - was too far astern which had the following consequences:
(a) the vessel
had a permanent stern trim which was compensated by filling up ballast tank
2;
(b) the A/Amax value was more than 95% if calculated on a stern trim of
0.40 m; if the calculation was made on even keel the Amax value was below
95%, but the margin line was submerged.
Note:
The A/Amax value
is obtained by summarising the damage stability calculations with 1 and
2 compartments flooded, based on IMO Resolution 265 by means of a probabilistic
method.
All this was not
mentioned in the "Trim and Stability Booklet" made by Ship Consulting
Oy, dated 20.01.91.
This "Trim
and Stability Booklet" as well as another calculation by Ship Consulting
Oy without date concerning the influence of the duck tail was received by
N&T from the previous owners and sent to B.V. by letter of 07.12.92.
Upon request
of N&T Meyer Werft sent to B.V. by letter of 23.12.92 various drawings and
a Meierform, Bremen calculation dated 17.10.92 concerning the "Floodable length
criteria numeral factor of subdivision".
By letter of
19.01.93 (i.e. after take-over of the vessel) BV-Paris (DuPont) confirmed
to BV-Gothenburg:
According to Ship
Consulting Oy, Turku, BV-Paris discovered the deficiencies stated above under
(a) - (c) after having reviewed the stability documentation submitted by N&T
and others and consequently declared the "Trim and Stability Booklet" dated
20.01.91 "temporary", instructed N&T to order a new "Trim and Stability Booklet"
including all criteria plus Amax calculation (which they did with Ship Consulting
Oy) and instructed BV-Sweden just to issue "temporary" PSSC's and Load Line
Certificates as long as the "Trim and Stability Booklet" would be "temporary".
This required inter alia Anders Wirstam to carry out Load Line Surveys every
3 months, or at least, issue new "temporary" L.L. Certificates every 3 months.
Based on the
present level of information of this 'Group of Experts' there is no indication
of any involvement of Sjöfartsverket in this particular part, although it
can be expected that the vessel's stability documentation had been checked,
because according to the "Guidance to Surveyors on Procedures for Operational
Control of Ships" (Enclosure
6.4.120) item 2.4., the surveyor had the following rights:
»Damage Control
Plan
The
surveyor may determine if a damage control plan is provided on a passenger
ship and whether the crew are familiar with their duties and the proper
use of the ship's installations and equipment for damage control purposes.
The officers may also be asked to explain about the boundaries of the watertight
compartments, the openings therein with the means of closure and position
of any controls thereof and the arrangements for the correction of any list
due to flooding.
The officers should have a sound knowledge of the effect on trim and stability
of their ship in the event of damage to and consequent flooding of a compartment
and counter measures to be taken.«
The B.V. head office
files also reveal the following:
- Fax Ship Consulting
Oy dated 28.03.94:
»MSC/Cir.1574
Damage
stability calculation for "Estonia"
mean draught: 5,55 m, trim: 0,57 m; GM 1,55 m
cross-flooding assumed on empty tanks 16A + 15A
freshwater tanks 4A + 4B, heeling tanks 13 + 14
(heeling tanks about 50% filled).
The
side casings on A-deck forward and aft are assumed to be weathertight.«
Note: Here
was a handwritten remark on the fax: "to be dealt with".
The "side casings"
on A-deck = car deck are the "side houses" which were not weathertight because
of the openings in both front bulkheads for the lugs and hooks of the hydraulic
and manual side locks of the visor. This was acceptable from the point of
view of the Load Line Convention because the "side casings" were considered
to be closed structures above the bulkhead deck. Also SOLAS 1974 - II-1, Rule
71 (margin line condition) excluded the theoretical flooding of the deck and
therefore such openings remained without closures in those years. Moreover,
as long as the visor remained weathertight no water could penetrate these
openings anyway, because they were located inside the rubber packings of the
visor at both front bulkheads. As soon as the visor started to "leak" and
became filled with water, these openings became a problem because they extended
from about 300 mm above the 3rd stringer level to the 2nd stringer level which
is within the area of watermarks visible inside the visor. Behind the openings
there was a void space located between A-deck and B-deck, which was accessible
only through an opening in B-deck with a sill of 200 mm height, but without
cover. It is unknown to this 'Group of Experts' whether the handwritten remark
"to be dealt with" on the fax dated 28.03.94, i.e. 6 months before the casualty,
had been followed up and, if so, to what effect.
- In a further fax
dated 30.03.94 from BV-Paris to BV-Gothenburg it is stated:
»re: Compartment
10
-
the 500 mm butterfly valve operated from bridge between tanks 13 and 14
is not large enough. Valve has to be calculated according to A.266;
Note: Tanks 13 and 14 are the heeling tanks.
- down flooding ducts mentioned;
-
trim always to be 0,6-0,75 m by stern;
- as noted in original stability booklet down flooding ducts are arranged
in tweendeck
(deck below A-deck, i.e. 1st deck);
File ends
16.06.94.
In addition, the
following information could be taken from the files of BV-Paris:
- Letter BV-Paris
to BV-Gothenburg:
»re: cross-flooding
between heeling tanks. For this purpose we need to know type and section
of this connection, i.e. dissymetric flooding in compartment 10 (85-98)
1 m² hole to be made.«
- The damage stability
calculation by Ship Consulting Oy proved that there was some difficulty to
pass the criteria.
Although these information
relating to the time after the take-over are not strictly in line with the
structuring of this report they have to be mentioned here already to demonstrate:
(a) the deep
involvement of the B.V. head office, Paris and
(b) the
obvious fact that B.V. and N&T had some problems with the fulfilment of SOLAS
requirements concerning stability criteria which were not solved at the time
when the vessel sank.
In summary it can
be concluded that B.V. and N&T obviously still had serious problems after
the vessel had been in her new service for more than 1 year.
At a meeting
with Capt. Hummel in July 1996 Veli Matti Junnila of Ship Consulting Oy, who
had made the calculations for the old Trim & Stability Manual dated 20.01.91
and who was working on the new one upon instructions of N&T at the time of
casualty, gave the following comments:
- When rechecking
the intact and damage stability in the light of the new requirements B.V.
found out that the Centre of Gravity (CG) was too much astern. For this reason
she had always stern trim.
- To correct this and to reduce the swell in the archipelago, the duck tail
was fitted, which indeed allowed a reduced stern trim and increased the GM
because the waterline area was increased. Also the damage stability was improved
because the duck tail created more buoyancy in damaged condition.
- The problem, however, was the margin line which is a theoretical line 3
inches or 76 mm below bulkhead deck = car deck. This line must not be submerged
in the final stage of the flooding of two compartments - a requirement since
SOLAS 1965 - a condition which the ferry did fulfil only with stern trim.
- As the first
Stability Booklet as well as the second one issued 20.01.91, did not
indicate the stern trim requirement and further, did not take into account
the duck tail, the built-in 85 tons of steel and, finally, also the stabilisers,
B.V. demanded a new "Trim and Stability Booklet" and declared the old
one "preliminary".
- He was still
working on this booklet when the casualty occurred.
- The Stability
Booklet of 20.01.91 is based on the actual inclining experiment of 11.01.91
when the duck tail was fitted and the 85 ts steel were built-in already.
Note: According
to the amended SOLAS 1974 - Chapter II-1, Regulation 22, since 1991 passenger
vessels have to perform inclining experiments at least every 5 years (see
Enclosure 6.4.121).
- That the cross-flooding
valve between the heeling tanks 13 and 14 - a 500 mm butterfly valve operated
from the bridge - was not large enough to comply with the requirements of
IMO Resolution A.266 (Enclosure
6.4.122).
Note: This
valve had previously been connected to the WT-doors, i.e. when the WT-doors
were closed this valve opened automatically. Reportedly this connection had
been removed whilst the vessel was owned by Silja, however, there were rumours
that the Estonians had re-established the connection.
