From the before-mentioned the following
Sequence of Events
has been developed whereby the various statements of Silver Linde are not taken into consideration.

27.9.94

ca. 19h30 : Vessel left berth in Tallinn.
                  Note: Bengt Nilsson has stated that the vessel left the berth when they entered the restaurant. As the restaurant opens only at 19h30 it was either at that time or later that the vessel sailed. Vessel's trim was said to have been 0.5 m by the stern, she had a starboard list of 1°, although the port trim tank was full and the starboard trim tank was empty and in spite of the fact that gale force winds had been forecasted from SW-ly direction, i.e. from port side, thus increasing the starboard list without any possibility to counter-act.

ca. 20h20 : buoy off Suurupi Lighthouse passed and course 262°.

since 21h00 : Watch on bridge : 2nd mate Peeter Kannussaar 3rd mate Andres Tammes Trainee officer: Einar Kuk
Note: Due to the increasing SW-ly storm the starboard list increased to 2°-4°. (Statement Einar Kuk)

since 22h00 : AB Silver Linde on hourly safety rounds incl. cardeck/Deck 1 commencing 30 minutes after the full hour, ending just before or at the full hour.

ca. 22h45 : After having made a distance of 48 nm at full speed - 19.5 kn - the vessel left the shelter of mainland/islands and due to increasing sea/swell from SW-ly direction the speed went down, although the 4 main engines continued on full power. At about that time "Estonia" was overtaking "Mariella" off Hangö.

28.9.94

since 00h00 : On watch in engine room - 3rd eng. Margus Treu - Motorman Hannes Kadak ca. 00h00 :
- Silver Linde returned to the bridge from safety round.

ca. 00h05/10 : - Einar Kuk left bridge and went to his cabin on Deck 4, port side.

ca. 00h14/15 : - Vessel changed course to 287° at waypoint 59°20'N; 22°00,0E, stabilizers activated.
Note: The above waypoint is obtained by going backwards on course 287° from a position ca. 0.5 nm North of the visor position to the intersection with the course line 262° from the buoy off Suurupi Lighthouse. This means that the vessel has made about 18 kn from the a/m buoy to the waypoint and ca. 14.5 kn from the waypoint to ca. 0.5 nm North of the visor position where she was at approximately 00h55/01h00 when the speed was reduced, and course was changed to port.

00h26 : - Valters Kikuts being on a stairway at port side of 7th Deck in front of the accommodation stated to have seen the visor moving up and down and an athwartship gap opening/closing between visor/forecastle deck with water gashing in/out.
Note: The timing must be wrong because the respective banging noises were only heard by many passengers much later. There is absolutely nothing in the other statements which could confirm Kikuts' observation already at that time. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that Chief mate Juhan Herma and 1st Eng. Arvo Tulvik would have noted such a dangerous development at and from their cabins in front of the accommodation and would have taken action as they apparently did immediately after the severe listing.

ca. 00h30 : - Henrik Silaste went to 0-Deck in engine room to repair the vacuum system.
- Mats Hillerström settled in the open aft pprt of Deck 6.
- Silver Linde left the bridge for his last round.

ca. 00h40 : - Einar Kuk saw Silver Linde in the service door of the Admiral's Pub.

00h46 : - Hannes Kadak saw on the monitor in the engine control room (ECR) that some water penetrated the bow ramp which he did not report to anybody, left the ECR after return of Margus Treu and worked in the workshop next door.

ca. 00h45/50 : - Many passsengers - in particular on Decks 4 and 1 - heard 2-3 heavy bangs, crashes, scraping noises from forward below respectively above, vessel shaking/vibrating - vessel was labouring very heavily.

00h50 Einar Kuk back in his cabin, goes to bed, but cannot sleep.
Note: It has to be assumed that in the meantime Silver Linde has reported to the bridge that there was increasing water ingress onto cardeck through the slightly open bow ramp.

ca. 00h50/55 : - Many passengers observed a reduction and/or disappear-ance of the vibration level created by the running engines. Note: It has to be assumed that those on the bridge reduced the pitch which via the combinator led to a reduction of the main engine revolutions and turned the vessel slowly to port, i.e. the bow into wind/sea, most probably with the aim to seek shelter leeward of the island of Hiiumaa - the only option they had. - Many passengers observed/felt that the behaviour of the vessel changed, i.e. the ferry made deeper/wider movements, a definite indication for a speed reduction.

ca. 00h56/58 : - Carl Övberg in cabin 1049 below cardeck heard the well known noises of the starting of hydraulic pumps and subsequently the squeaking/shrieking noises of the hydraulic cylinders in operation, followed 1-2 minutes later, i.e. by

ca. 00h58/01h00 : - 2-3 strong, sharp metallic noises from forward heard by many passengers and crew members in different variations depending on where in the vessel they were, followed by beating noises, like a sledge-hammer beating against the hull.
Note: These sharp metallic noises were most probably caused by the breaking of the visor hinges beginning with starboard outside (starboard inside could not create a breaking noise as that hinge plate was more or less cracked already), port inside and finally port outside when the visor was in slightly raised position and slightly shifted to port. Further banging and cracking / crashing / scraping noises heard especially by those in cabins below the cardeck who began to leave their cabins or had done so already before (Ulla Marianne Tenmann for example).

01h00 : - Jasmina Waidinger and Daniel Svensson in cabin 1027 below cardeck had been hearing extreme noises from the cardeck already for some time and suddenly heard also the sound of running water from above, something heavy moving on the cardeck from one point to the other and heavy crashing noises. - vessel made rolling movements to both side and maintained a starboard list of 5°-6°

at 01h01 : - according to the statement of Mikael Öun, when

at 01h02 : - the vessel suddenly and abruptly listed to starboard. Everybody understood at once that the situation was serious when the list did not decrease but increased, and they left their cabins immediately:
- those from the cabins below cardeck found water in the alleyway in front of their doors, partly already in the cabins and on the way up on cardeck level.
Note: It is evident that the water must have been on 1st Deck and in particular on cardeck aleady well before the list started. Vessel was probably heading 200°/180° at that time.
- Mikael Öun's battery powered alarm clock fell from the table at the sudden listing, the batteries became disconnected and the clock stopped at 00h02 Swedish time (he had shifted the clock back from Estonian to Swedish time only 2 hours before), i.e. the sudden list occurred at 01h02 ship's time. - 2nd Eng. Peeter Tüür left his cabin (7th Deck, port side, 1st cabin) and ran into 1st Eng. Arvo Tulvik (7th Deck, 1st cabin at port side in front of accommodation and overlooking the foreship) who shouted: "Visor broke loose, we better beach the vessel." - Motorman Hannes Kadak ran from the workshop into the ECR where Margus Treu was watching the monitor and said: "The situation is serious, the bow ramp was struck and became broken." He saw lots of water on the cardeck.

ca. 01h03/01h04 : Henrik Silaste ran from 0-Deck to the ECR, where he arrived after Kadak, and saw Treu and Kadak watching the monitor. Large quantities of water were penetrating the bow ramp at both sides, the bow ramp was somewhat open, but they could not see the visor, water penetrated continuously independent of vessel's movements.

01h00/01h05 : Margus Treu saw Silver Linde on the cardeck monitor. Note: It can be reasonably assumed that Silver Linde, probably together with others, activated the hydraulic pumps and tried to close the ramp and tried to hold down the visor hydraulically, which failed totally.

01h05 : Mats Hillerström had worked his way from the starboard side of the 6th Deck aft part to the high port side and looked over the side, where he saw the stabilizer fin just sticking out of the water, that the vessel was turning to port and the speed was reduced. The list increased rapidly. Note: The starboard list is ca. 20° when port fin comes out of the water.

ca. 01h10 : List should have reached 30°/35° and main engines stopped, vessel turned rapidly to port due to the rudder effect of the starboard stabilizer-fin increasing with the list, whilst the effect of the rudder blades - now hard astarboard - were decreasing with increasing list. Vessel turned on a south-easterly heading and the low starboard side was exposed to wind and sea, which increased the water ingress additionally.

01h15 - Margus Treu saw water penetrating the bow ramp onto the cardeck. Note: That was certainly so, but he did not see it the first time then. It was probably the time when the visor separated from the vessel. At that time the main engines had already stopped, but the auxiliaries were still running, when at

ca. 01h20 : - 4th Mate Kaimar Kikas asked from the bridge whether it would be possible to give the vessel a port list, which it was not, because the port tank was full and the starboard tank empty. Margus Treu stated to have tried the pumps, but they were sucking air. By that time Henrik Silaste and Hannes Kadak were on their way up through the emergency exit and when they were on Deck 6 level also the auxiliaries stopped. According to Silaste the list was then 42°-45° - now the emergency generator took over. Note: Silaste has testified that it took ca. 10 minutes after they had left through the funnel on Deck 8 until the vessel was on her side, which was at 01h30/31, thus it was probably at ca. 01h20 when the auxiliaries stopped. According to Margus Treu Kikas phoned from the bridge again and asked whether it would be possible to pump freshwater overboard from the starboard tanks, which it was not as there was no more power for the pumps because the auxiliaries had shut off already. Thereafter also Margus Treu left through the emergency exit which was probably 01h25, because he he reached the funnel when the vessel was more or less on the side and this was at 01h30.
Note: The statement of Treu that at 01h30 the list was 45° consequently has to be wrong.

01h22 : "Mayday" message on channel 16, repeated at

01h23 : and distress communication between "Estonia" / "Silja Europa" and "Mariella" until

01h29 : whereafter "Estonia" remained silent 01h30/31 : vessel on the side

Finally we would like to inform you about the preliminary findings of the professional photo analyser B.E.W. Roberts:

1. Introduction
The object of this report is to detect and identify any structural rupture or damage which could have contributed to the loss of the Ro/Ro Ferry Estonia. Supporting information is available on Drawing 590-1106 dated 31.10.79 and on prints from a Video Tape dated 18.09.94 of the Estonia prior to her loss. On this tape frames 0:05:13; and 0:50:22; and 0:05:23 evidence of structural misalignment in the area of both the visor hinge plates (2) and (3) can be seen. For identification of components, bracketed numbers e.g. (5) in the text refer to annotations on the attached drawing (enclosure No. 4).

2 Evidence of damage
A detailed examination of the video tape shows the only area of damage that can be identified is limited to the starboard visor hinge arrangement: This is referred to in the paragraphs below of this Report in a detailed evalutation of the area.

3. Inner Visor Hinge Plate (2)
The inner visor hinge plate is correct and straight on its fore and aft axis other than a section of approximately 150 mm between the vertical centre line of the bolt (10) and the aft end of the visor arm (1). This section has a clockwise twist which gives a downward inclination to the bolt (10) to which it is attached. This inclination of the bolt (10) extends from its port end (A) to the starboard face of the outer vessel's hinge plate (5). The video image does not allow a precise calculation of this angle but the average of a series of measurements show it to be approximately 4 degrees which gives a downward misalignment of the axis of the bolt (A-B) of approximately 25 mm at the starboard face of the outer vessel's hinge plate (5). The significance of this misalignment will be seen when the inclination of the outer bushing (8) is examined in paragraph 4.

4 Outer Visor Hinge Plate (3)
An aft section of approximately 400 mm of the outer visor hinge plate (3) together with the outer steel bushing it carries, has a significant rotation in an anti-clockwise direction on its fore and aft axis. The whole assembly is visibly rotated to such an extent that both its inner and outer ends can be seen as an ellipse. This is in marked contrast to the inner bushing assembly (7) which is symmetrical to the axis of the bolt (A-B). From the Makers Drawing 590/1106 it can be seen that the bolt (10) is a single assembly with a common axis. This conflicts with evidence in paragraphs 3 and 4 where the section of the bolt from the inner steel bushing (7) to the starboard face of the vessel hinge plate (5) shows an angular difference in relation to the outer steel bushing (8). This angular change from the crossbeam axis of the fixed bushing (6) to the axis of the outer steel bushing (8) is approximately 9°. As a consequence there is a gap between the outer vessel hinge plate (5) and the outer visor hinge plate (3) which is at its upper part approximately 7 mm and at its lower part approximately 15 mm wide. As a further consequence the outside part of the outer steel bushing (8) is substantially larger than its inner part, although both should be identical according to drawing 590/1106.

5 Misalignment of the Bolt (10)
From the Video Image a significant linear difference is apparent between the axis of the bolt (10) at its interface with the outer bushing (8) of the outer visor hinge plate (3). The evidence for this is based on the average of an extensive number of measurements, and on visual examination of all relevant video images of the area. It is physically not possible for the bolt to penetrate the by ca. 9° misaligned outer steel bushing (8) unless parts of the outer steel bushing have been cut away, as is apparently the case. From the video image it is clearly visible that the securing plate (9) is totally missing, that 2 out of 4 securing plate bolts (11) are sticking out of the outer steel bushing (8), that a section of approximately 150/160° of steel and bronze bushings are missing, and that the bolt is not in place where it should be. The angular difference in the hinge bolt and the stated observations require further investigation. A total rupture of the bolt (10) at the starboard face of the fixed bushing (6) would be an explanation, although the Dwg. 590/1106 shows the bolt (10) to be a very substantial assembly. The total disintegration of the material in the outer steel bushing (8) would allow considerable random movement.
So much for the analysis of the video showing the condition of the starboard visor hinges on the evening of the 17th September 1994 upon departure from Tallinn.

We are looking forward to your comments.
Sincerely yours,
with best regards

Peter Holtappels
Werner Hummel

enclosures